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Abstract 
 
Wireless sensor network is a multi-hop ad hoc network formed by a large number 
of low-cost micro-sensor nodes which communicate through radio channels. It is 
widely used in many areas in modern society and attracts a lot of attention from 
researchers. This research is on wireless sensor network security and it focuses on key 
management in hierarchical wireless sensor networks. Through literature review, the 
drawback and weakness of existing key management schemes are analyzed from 
various aspects including key establishment, key distribution, key update, 
authentication and node operation mechanism. Assessment criteria for key 
management scheme are proposed under different requirements and constraints of 
wireless sensor networks. The security criteria cover keying model, key distribution, 
key update, node operation and resilience. For cluster based hierarchical wireless 
sensor networks, an assistant node is introduced in a cluster to deal with the situation 
of cluster head compromise and to keep the member nodes securely staying in the 
network. With introduction of assistant nodes, a complete secure efficient hierarchical 
key management scheme (SEHKM) for wireless sensor network is proposed. The 
scheme supports three types of keys and the big improvement over existing key 
management schemes is on group key update, which is based on pseudo-random 
numbers and group Diffie-Hellman. The analysis and evaluation have shown that that 
SEHKM offers strong security with efficient operation from energy consumption 
point of view. 
 
Key words: wireless sensor network, security, key management, assistant node 
management, SEHKM, key update 
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1. Introduction 
Wireless sensor network is a multi-hop ad hoc network formed by a large number 
of low-cost micro-sensor nodes which communicate through radio channels [1, 2]. It 
is widely used in many areas, such as military, agriculture, weather conditions and 
health care [3]. For applications in which, information protection is essential, security 
for the wireless sensor network needs to be considered. The topic has attracted a lot of 
attention from the researchers in wireless sensor network. There are many aspects in 
wireless sensor network security and key management is one of them. Key 
management includes key establishment, distribution and update. This research is 
focuses on key management. In this chapter, a background introduction of key 
management is presented. It also outlines significance, objective and scope of the 
research. Finally, the main structure of the thesis is outlined. 
 
1.1. Background of Wireless Sensor Networks 
In early 1970s, point to point transmission based sensor networks appeared. This is 
the first generation of sensor networks. With development in the related disciplines, 
there are many different types of sensors coming up. The processing capability was 
dramatically enhanced with advanced microprocessors and signal processing 
technology. This can be classified as the second generation of sensor networks. 1990s 
had seen large multi- functional intelligent sensors for various applications [4, 5]. With 
fast development of wireless and network technologies, radio based sensor networks 
became a trend in the field of sensor networks. Now wireless sensor networks have 
been widely used in many areas. Figure 1 shows a generally wireless sensor network.  
The main advantages of wireless sensor network are low cost and easy deployment 
and low operations maintenance. Sensor nodes can be randomly deployed in a 
designated area and self-organized in the initialization phase. For applications in 
dangerous environments such as volcano monitoring [6], it is too dangerous for 
human to attend at the sites and wireless sensor network becomes a good choice. A 
wireless sensor network’s self-organization in its lifetime is a very important feature 
that reduces the human intervention in wireless sensor networks operation and 
maintenance [7]. The modern microprocessor technology and radio communication 
technology have made the low-cost wireless sensor network nodes available. That 
contributes to the wide wireless sensor network applications in many areas including 
military, agriculture, environment and health care.  In military, wireless sensor 
networks are essential in C4ISRT (command, control, communication, computing, 
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting) system [8]. Wireless sensor 
networks have the advantages of fast deployment, self-organization and fault 
tolerance which lead to a promising future of wireless sensor networks in modern 
military technology. Because a wireless sensor network is formed of large number of 
low-cost sensor nodes, the network can survive even some of the nodes are damaged 
 8 
 
or destroyed by the enemies. They can be utilized in battle field surveillance, 
reconnaissance of enemy forces and terrain, circumstance assessment of loss, 
targeting etc [9]. There are many existing successful military wireless sensor networks 
applications such as boomerang shooter detection system [10] and VigiNet [11]. 
Wireless sensor networks are also widely applied in environment and agriculture 
monitoring. The applications include animal tracing, environment condition 
monitoring, meteorological monitoring and disaster detection. The well-known 
GDI(Great Duck Island) [12, 13] which is a study on birds  and CORIE [14], an 
environment monitoring system, are two successful application cases.  The 
applications of wireless sensor networks in medical system and health care include 
monitoring and collection of body biology data, tracing doctors and patients in 
hospital and medicine management. CodeBlue [15], a medical care and disease 
response system, developed by Harvard University is a good example. Wireless 
sensor networks can also find applications in many other areas such as smart home, 
industrial automation, telecommunication etc [7]. Even with its wide application, 
wireless sensor network is still a young technology. Its advancing is a big challenge 
for the research community. Figure 1 shows a general wireless sensor network. 
 
 
Figure 1: A wireless sensor network 
1.1.1. Constraints of Wireless Sensor Networks 
The wireless sensor network is formed by sensor nodes which are able to collect 
information or control end device. A sensor node built on an embedded system has 
three functions: sensor interface, data processing and network interface [7]. Sensor 
interface collects the sensed information. Some simple data processing functions can 
be carried out on the sensor nodes. The network interface is for communication and 
networking. A node usually has four units: a transceiver unit, a processing unit, a 
sensing unit and a power unit [16, 17]. The transceiver unit transmits and receives 
data and it links a node to a network. The processing unit includes processor and 
memory. It processes and stores data. The sensing unit has a sensor and analog to 
digital converter (ADC). It catches physical information from surrounding 
environment and converts information to digital data. The power unit usually is a 
battery which provides energy for all functions of a sensor node. Figure 2 describes a 
sensor node’s units. 
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Figure 2: The components of a sensor node 
In a wireless sensor network, sensor nodes are independent tiny devices. Each of 
them has its own individual battery. The general wireless sensor network constraints 
are listed in the following [18-20]. 
 Hardware limitation: As mentioned above, a number of functions need to be 
carried out in a node. Due to a node’s small physical size and the low cost, its 
memory and processor power are limited. The computation and memory 
constraints need to be considered in wireless sensor network protocol and 
system design.  
 Limited energy supply: wireless sensor network nodes are powered by 
battery. Once a node is deployed, the battery is not replaceable in many 
applications.  In another words, a node’s life is mainly dependent on its 
battery.  The battery has to serve the lifetime of a node. The main consumers 
of the energy in a node are its data processing unit and network 
communication unit. Network design needs to optimize its overall performance 
with the constraints of limited energy supply to maximize wireless sensor 
network nodes’ life.  
 Communication: In a wireless sensor network, all communications are 
through radio channels. A node’s radio transmission range should not be too 
big with power consumption consideration. i.e. node to node hop distance 
should be reasonable long. Radio channels suffer interference from the 
environment and other wireless communications. The data transmission is 
unreliable due to data error and packet loss. Radio signal is exposed and that 
means a radio receiving device in the range can intercept the radio signal. 
Without the security protection, wireless sensor network is vulnerable to 
information leak and various attacks.  
 
1.1.2. Unique Characteristics of Wireless Sensor Networks 
The special characteristics of wireless sensor network cannot be found in traditional 
networks. The understanding of these unique properties is helpful in wireless sensor 
network research. The unique characteristics of wireless sensor networks are listed 
below [21]. 
 Limited resources: As it is presented in last section, wireless sensor nodes 
 10 
 
have limitation on their capabilities of computing, communication and energy 
supply. 
 Dynamic: A sensor node should be removed from the network if its battery 
has exhausted or it has other failures. In some applications, a sensor node 
cannot serve the whole life of the network, thus some new nodes are required 
to be added into the network. This may leads to changed network topology 
which require dynamic functions.  
 Self-organization: A wireless sensor network can be self-organized. It should 
be able to adjust to changes in condition in forming an independent network 
without human intervention. 
 Multi-hop communication: In a wireless sensor network, a node is only 
capable to communicate with its immediate neighbor nodes. The 
communication of two nodes which are far away has to transmit data through 
several intermediate nodes. The sensor nodes in wireless sensor networks are 
data collector, sender and router at the same time. 
 Application relevance: The characteristics of a wireless sensor network are 
highly dependent on its application. Different applications collect different 
kinds of data which makes them have differences in network topology, routing 
protocol, physical signal and etc. This is a huge difference with traditional 
networks. 
 
1.1.3. Security in Wireless Sensor Networks 
Security is an important factor to be considered in many wireless sensor network 
applications. Wireless sensor networks are even more vulnerable to attacks due to 
their unique characteristics. Listed below are the potential attacks on wireless sensor 
networks [22, 23]. 
 Attacks against privacy: In Wireless sensor networks, large volumes of 
information can be easily available through radio and remote access and this 
can compromise privacy. Attacks against privacy include traffic analysis, 
camouflages adversaries and monitor and eavesdropping. 
 Physical attacks: Attackers can physically capture nodes deployed in hostile 
outdoor field. They can extract cryptographic keys, modify programming or 
replace the nodes with malicious nodes. 
 Node attacks: These attacks act on node. They are node subversion, node 
malfunction, node outage, node replication and false node. 
 Passive information gathering: An attacker can collect data from a wireless 
sensor network with enough resources and powerful hardware if data is not or 
poorly encrypted. 
 Attacks on information in transit: wireless sensor network communication 
can be easily eavesdropped. Attackers can monitor the communication, 
interrupt, intercept, modify or fabricate packets thus, provide wrong 
information to the base stations or sinks at any time. 
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 DoS: This DoS attack attempts to exhaust resources on aim node by sending 
many useless messages and prevents user from accessing services or resources. 
In wireless sensor networks, DoS attacks at physical layer can be jamming and 
tampering. Collision and exhaustion unfairness are at link layer. Black holes, 
neglect and greed, misdirection are at network layer. Flooding and 
resynchronization are at transport layer. 
 Message corruption: The integrity of a message modified by an attacker is 
compromised. 
 Routing attacks: These are attacks happen on network layer and inc ludes 
Sybil attack, sinkhole attack, wormhole attack, hello flood attack, selective 
forwarding and spoofed, altered and replayed routing information. 
 
With various potential threats, wireless sensor networks need to have security 
mechanism to provide required security services for their applications. Wireless 
sensor network security requirements are summarized in the following [18, 23, 24]. 
  
 Confidentiality: Nodes should not reveal any data to unintended recipients. 
 Integrity: Data should not be changed between transmissions due to the 
environment or malicious activities. 
 Data freshness: Old data should not be used as new (i.e., prevent replay 
attacks). 
 Authentication: Data used in decision-making processes must originate from 
the correct source. 
 Robustness: When some nodes are compromised, the entire network should 
not also become compromised. The quantitative value with which this 
requirement should be satisfied depends on the application. 
 Self-organization: Nodes should be independent and flexible enough to be 
self-organizing (autonomous) and self-healing (failure tolerant). 
 Availability: The network should not fail frequently. 
 Time synchronization: Collaborative node applications need time 
synchronization. Time synchronization protocols should not be manipulated to 
produce inaccurate time. 
 Secure localization: Nodes should be able to accurately and securely acquire 
location information. 
 
There are some security mechanisms provided in industrial wireless sensor network 
standards, such as ZigBee [25]. However, wireless sensor network security is far from 
mature. There are many ongoing research works in various aspects of wireless sensor 
networks. On service level, there are works on secure data aggregation, secure 
localization and intrusion detection. At the network level, node authentication and 
secure routing are required to protect nodes in a network from being connected to 
unauthorized parties and secure its communication with the base station. The main 
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security mechanism is based on encryption and authentication. When a node transmits 
data to another node, it needs encryption to provide data confidentiality. When a node 
receives data from its neighbor, it needs to authenticate the data is genuinely from that 
node. For encryption and authentication to work, a security framework and security 
key management is needed. A general wireless sensor network security mechanism 
and service diagram [26] is shown in Figure 3. Wireless sensor network security key 
management is one of the hot wireless sensor network research areas and it is the 
focus of this research.    
 
 
Figure 3: Security mechanism and srvices in wireless sensor networks 
1.2. Motivation of the Research 
Wireless sensor network has found wide applications in many areas, such as 
battlefield surveillance, environmental monitoring, health care, target tracking and so 
on [7]. For some applications, security is a very important issue. For example, in some 
critical infrastructure (such as power plant, smart grid, big dam) monitoring and 
control systems, if the security is compromised, the result will be devastating, 
especially in today’s world with big threat from all kinds of terrorists. All these 
reasons have made the wireless sensor network security a significant research area. 
Key management can be considered as the core of wireless sensor network security. 
  
Wireless sensor network security key management includes the security structure, 
key generation, key distribution and key refreshment. Due to wireless sensor networks’ 
many constraints in computation, communication, memory and energy, key 
management schemes need to have good power efficiency apart from providing 
strong security.  
 
Different wireless sensor network applications have different features and different 
security requirements. For example, volcano monitoring network and military 
surveillance network are supposed to use different hardware and have different 
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security requirement. The latter is more sensible to information leaking and enemy 
attack. Generally, security strength is only one factor in the overall wireless sensor 
network design. With the constraints discussed previously, network performance, 
node life and security have to be considered all together. Some applications may have 
more emphasis on performance and for others security may be the number one 
consideration. In most cases, long nodes’ life is expected. Therefore, there will be 
compromise among all aspects of a wireless sensor network. For example, if a 
wireless sensor network provides a very strong security, but only lasts a very short 
period of time, then its application value is limited. This research is to search for good 
key management schemes, not only offering strong security, but also having good 
power efficiency.  
 
This research is significant. Firstly, the proposed key management scheme 
combines two existing schemes and has advantages over them. It applies secure key 
management in HWireless sensor networks. Moreover, the proposed scheme is 
efficient and secure. It reduces resources cost while maintain security. In addition the 
scheme is flexible, scalable and accessible. Thus the scheme is suitable for large scale 
Wireless sensor networks. 
 
1.3. Objective and Scope of the Research 
Hierarchical structured wireless sensor network is a very popular category of 
wireless sensor networks. It offers good features on network operation, data 
aggregation and security.  This research focuses on key management in hierarchical 
wireless sensor networks. Based on existing schemes, new key management scheme 
is proposed for a hierarchical wireless sensor network. The main goal is on the 
improvement of power efficiency and security. Other requirements, such as the 
flexibility, scalability and accessibility are also considered. The main tasks of this 
research are as follows: 
 
 To analyze the requirements of wireless sensor network key management and 
existing problems. The main key management schemes are assessed on 
security, efficiency and operation requirements. The features of each scheme 
are outlined. 
 To propose a new key management scheme based on combination of two 
existing schemes. It includes key establishment, key distribution and key 
update. The proposed scheme should satisfy as many requirements of key 
management as possible.  
 To analyze and evaluate the newly proposed key management scheme on 
security strength and performance. Simulation results are required to back the 
analysis. 
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1.4. Structure of Thesis 
The structure of this thesis is as follow: 
 
 Chapter 1: Introduction. An introduction of wireless sensor networks and 
wireless sensor network security background is given. Then the motivation, 
objective and scope of the research are presented. The structure of thesis is 
outlined. 
 Chapter 2: Review of wireless sensor networks key management schemes. 
In this chapter, requirements of key management in wireless sensor networks 
are discussed. Three simple keying models are described. Classification of 
key management schemes is presented. Some popular key management 
schemes are reviewed. Finally, based on the above analysis, research 
questions are proposed. 
 Chapter 3: The criteria for key management scheme assessment. This 
chapter is the answer of first research question. Firstly, the requirements and 
contents of key management are analyzed. Criteria to assess security of key 
management schemes are proposed. Also the criteria on efficiency and 
operation are given as well. Finally the assessments of two existing schemes 
based on the proposed criteria are discussed.  
 Chapter 4: Cluster based wireless sensor networks and key management. 
This chapter includes the answer of second research question. Firstly, the 
architecture of wireless sensor networks and node clustering are introduced. 
Then the definition and operation of assistant node are described. The 
security analysis of the assistant node is presented too. 
 Chapter 5: The secure efficient hierarchical key management scheme. 
This chapter presents the proposed scheme and it includes the answer of last 
research question. Firstly, two popular key management schemes are further 
analyzed. Then, the proposed scheme is presented to address the issues in the 
existing schemes. The proposed scheme supports three types of keys and the 
key establishment, distribution and update are described. The key 
management in node operation is shown too.  
 Chapter 6: The evaluation of SEHKM. The security strength and the 
performance of the proposed scheme is analyzed and discussed. The 
simulation results are presented to verify the scheme’s improvement. 
 Chapter 7: Conclusion. In this chapter, the contribution of research is 
highlighted. The future works are discussed.  
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1.5. Summary 
Wireless sensor network is a popular technology which is widely applied in many 
areas. Security as an important issue has attracted a lot of attention of researchers. 
This research focuses on key management for wireless sensor network security. In this 
chapter, the background information of the research topic is introduced. The 
motivation, significance and objective of research are presented. Lastly, the structure 
of the thesis is outlined. In the next chapter, the requirements and classification of key 
management scheme in wireless sensor networks will be discussed. Several existing 
schemes will be analyzed. 
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2. Review of Wireless Sensor Network Key 
Management Schemes 
Key management is a big challenging issue in wireless sensor network as it forms 
the basic security structure of the networks. Researchers attempt to apply existing 
security models and techniques of traditional networks on wireless sensor network. 
But there is a huge difference between sensor nodes and computers and they have 
different requirements and constraints. Existing security methods in traditional 
networks are not suitable on wireless sensor networks and they need to be changed. 
Various wireless sensor network key management schemes proposed so far attempt to 
satisfy the security, efficiency and operation requirements under the resource 
constrain of wireless sensor network. 
 
2.1. Requirements of Key Management in Wireless Sensor 
Networks 
As a main aspect of the wireless sensor network security, key management 
attempted to achieve some of security requirements [18, 23, 24] mentioned in section 
1.1.3. The first is confidentiality. It is that the content of the information flowing in 
wireless sensor network must be protected from disclosure to unauthorized parties. The 
second is authentication which is the parties who are able to access to the shared 
information should be identified and authenticated. The third one is data integrity and it 
means data should not be changed between transmissions due to the environment or 
malicious activities. Robustness is another requirement which deals with node 
compromise and attack. Freshness requirement in key management scheme should 
guarantee that each node gets the updated shared key. It should include forward and 
backward compatibility (or secrecy). Forward compatibility requires that a node should 
not be able to access the network and conduct further communication after it is 
compromised or departed. Backward compatibility is that a newly joined node should be 
able to access the network and communicate with other nodes, but not able to access 
stored previous communications [25].  
 
Security is not the only requirement of wireless sensor network key management. 
The architecture of wireless sensor network makes it different from traditional 
network and requires more [25]. First, nodes should be replaceable when 
compromised, damaged or out of power. It should be flexible and it requires that 
On-the-fly addition and revocation of nodes should also be supported. Moreover, 
scalability is another consideration. Wireless sensor network security key 
management schemes should operate on different level of security requirement and 
different size of wireless sensor networks. Besides, accessibility which addresses node 
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to node communications in the network adds another dimension in the requirement 
matrix. Flexibility, scalability and accessibility are the operation requirement of 
wireless sensor network. 
 
According to the constraints of wireless sensor network [18], key management 
schemes in wireless sensor networks should also consider efficiency requirements 
which include communication, computation, storage, and power consumption. These 
are wireless sensor network specific issues. The key management mechanism 
employed in a wireless sensor network should provide not only the required security 
strength, but also efficiency under the limited resources and operation requirement. 
Table 1 shows all the requirements of wireless sensor network key management. 
 
Table 1: Requirements of key management in wireless sensor network security 
Requirements Details 
Security requirement Confidentiality, authentication, data integrity, 
freshness and robustness. 
Efficiency requirement Reasonable communication, computation, storage and 
power consumption. 
Operation requirement Flexibility, scalability and accessibility 
 
2.2. Keying Models in Wireless Sensor Network 
There are three types of key models based on communication relationships. They 
are network key, pairwise key and group key [27]. Table 2 shows their characteristics.  
Table 2: Three types of keying models 
Model Description Advantage Disadvantage 
Network The whole 
network shared one 
key. 
Good efficiency, 
accessibility, flexibility 
and scalability. 
Security is weak. 
Pairwise Each pair of 
nodes shared one 
key, different pairs 
have different keys. 
Good accessibility and 
strong security strength. 
Efficiency, 
scalability and 
flexibility are not 
good. 
Group Each group of 
nodes shared one 
key, different 
groups use 
different keys. 
It combines the 
network and pairwise key 
model, has better security 
than network key and 
better efficiency than 
pairwise key. 
Accessibility, flexibility 
and scalability are good. 
Not easy to 
implement. 
Not suitable for 
all networks with 
different structure. 
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These three keying models are highlighted here because all key management 
schemes are combined by them. They are basic element for a key management.  
 
2.3. Classification of Key Management Schemes 
The existing wireless sensor network key management protocols can be classified 
in many ways. Here are several classifications based on different conditions. 
 
2.3.1. Single and Mixed Model Key Management Schemes 
The difference between single and mixed schemes is how many basic keying 
models the scheme uses. Single model key management applies only one kind of 
keying model while mixed model scheme applies a hybrid approach. Their advantages 
and disadvantages are compared in Table 2. Generally, the mixed model schemes have 
better security and worse efficiency than the single model ones. 
 
2.3.2. Hierarchical and Flat Wireless Sensor Network Key 
Management Schemes 
Wireless sensor networks can be classified as hierarchical networks and flat 
networks by network structure [1]. Figure 4 shows the hierarchical network and flat 
network. 
 
 
Figure 4: Wireless sensor network topologies 
 
In a hierarchical wireless sensor network, all nodes are divided into several clusters 
and each cluster has a head. A cluster head leads a group of general sensor nodes and 
all cluster heads are led by the head of cluster head. Every node belongs to a clus ter 
and communicates with base station through cluster head. In a flat network, all nodes 
have the same capability; they communicate with neighbors and transmit data to base 
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station one by one. Comparing with flat wireless sensor network, hierarchical wireless 
sensor network has many advantages. First, in hierarchical network, cluster head and 
base station manage the network. Normal nodes can only wake up when they are 
needed for data transmission or collection. Hence, the energy consumption would be 
reduced for this. Then, cluster head and cluster members exchange information in a 
cluster, it helps cluster head concludes the local information. Lastly, there is less 
competition between nodes for communication channel as cluster head transmits most 
data, more nodes can be deployed in the network. The hierarchical wireless sensor 
network has better scalability. However a cluster head manages the keys of all nodes in 
the same cluster. Hence the cluster will face serious problems if the head is 
compromised or damaged. This research focuses on key management in hierarchical 
wireless sensor network security. 
 
Eschenauer is a flat wireless sensor network key management. In this kind of 
schemes [21, 28-33], all nodes have the same ability and they manage the keys 
themselves or by working together. So the costs on each node are almost the same and 
it is higher than the normal nodes in a hierarchical wireless sensor network. 
 
2.3.3. Static and Dynamic Key Management Schemes 
According to whether or not the key management schemes consider the key refresh 
and node addition, replacement and revocation, they can be classified as static and 
dynamic key management [27]. The static schemes [21, 34] have no changes after 
initialization phase, do not refresh the keys and the network scale does not change, so 
there is no cost for these. However if the node is compromised, it leads to security 
problems. But the attackers hardly get the keys by compromising a node in a wireless 
sensor network which employ dynamic key management [35] because the keys 
change dynamically all the time. The dynamic schemes provide higher security 
strength, but it cost more computation, energy and communication resources. 
 
2.3.4. Stochastic and Deterministic Key Management Schemes 
In a stochastic key management scheme [28, 29], nodes take keys from the key 
pool randomly. The key distribution is simple and cost less computation and energy. 
But the nodes may store much more keys than they need and this kind of schemes 
may have problems on accessibility.  
 
The keys generated in a determinate way in a deterministic scheme [34]. Such as by 
some algorithms or identified information. These schemes need more computation, 
power and communication resources than the stochastic ones. But the memory usage 
is less and the nodes are able to access each other. 
 
 
 
 20 
 
2.3.5. Symmetric and Asymmetric Key Management Schemes 
The difference of the two type’s schemes is the encryption algorithm they used. The 
symmetric algorithm [28, 34] encrypts and decrypts messages by the same key. The 
usages of energy, communication and computation are small. But an asymmetric 
scheme [36] is securer because it uses different keys in encryption and decryption. It 
requires more resources. Figure 5 shows symmetric algorithm and asymmetric 
algorithm. 
 
Figure 5: (a) symmetric algorithm (b) asymmetric algorithm 
 
As the result of constraints of wireless sensor network, symmetric algorithm is 
more suitable for it. Because asymmetric key management costs more computation 
and energy resources, it is rarely applied on wireless sensor network. But there are 
some researches show that improved asymmetric algorithm can be applied on wireless 
sensor network. If the problem of resource limitation can be solved, asymmetric key 
management can be more attractive as its higher security level. There is a mechanism 
mixed the symmetric and asymmetric encryption, but it costs a lot and is for 
heterogeneous wireless sensor network. 
 
2.4. Popular Key Management Schemes 
2.4.1. Eschenauer Scheme 
Eschenauer [28] key pre-distribution scheme for wireless sensor network is one of 
the early key management schemes for wireless sensor network. In this scheme, a 
large key pool is generated for a wireless sensor network with N nodes. Each sensor 
node randomly takes k keys from the pool to establish a key ring where 1<k<<N. So 
every node has a unique key ring which contains k keys. When two nodes need to 
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communicate, they broadcast their keys’ IDs and search a common key in the key 
rings. If there is no common key, they find the third node which has the common keys 
with the both nodes which means the third one is able to communicate with the two 
nodes. It is possible for the two nodes to talk to each other by the third party. 
 
It is obviously that this scheme has the advantage that the size of key pool and key 
rings are scalable. In real applications the key pool and key rings can be adjusted 
appropriately when the networks expand or shrink. However, Eschenauer scheme fails 
to mention about authentication which is a requirement of wireless sensor network 
security. In addition, there is no cluster operation in the scheme. So it cannot be 
applied in hierarchical wireless sensor network which is an important structure of 
wireless sensor network. Then, Eschenauer may cost more energy to satisfy 
accessibility because some communication between nodes may pass many others. 
Lastly, when the size of network is big, the small key pool leads to weak security 
strength and large key pool will increase the memory cost. 
 
2.4.2. Du Scheme 
Du [29] proposed a key management scheme based on Eschenauer’s and Blom’s  
[37] in 2003. It uses the Blom’s key matrix instead of individual keys in Eschenauer 
scheme. 
 
Blom’s model is based on the idea of a symmetric matrix multiplication, where row 
i column j is equivalent to row j column i. Thus, when node i calculates key ij and 
node j calculates key ji, the keys are identical, leading to a commonly shared secret. 
Blom’s scheme distributes the information required for this calculation in terms of a 
public matrix and a private matrix. 
 
It generates a pool of key matrices, and then each node take a subset of the key 
matrix pool instead of key ring in Eschenauer. When two nodes establish 
communication, they find the common key matrix and calculate the pairwise key by 
Blom’s scheme. If there is no common key matrix, they find a third party which has 
common key matrices with the both nodes. 
 
The benefit of Du scheme is the strong robustness against node compromise. 
Because Du is similar to Eschenauer, the schemes have some common problems. It 
lacks the authentication and cluster operations. The accessibility is hard to be satisfied 
and it may cost more energy. On the other hand, it uses Blom’s scheme and it makes 
the proposed scheme very complex. It is difficult to implement in real sensor 
networks and the complexity also led to high energy consumption.  
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2.4.3. Panja Scheme 
Based on TDGH [38], a Tree based Group Deffi-Hellman algorithm, Panja [39] 
proposed a key management mechanism which is suitable for hierarchical wireless 
sensor network. The structure is a cluster head leads a group of general sensor nodes 
and all cluster heads are led by the head of cluster head. All sensor nodes pre- install a 
symmetric key for key transport encryption. Every node has a partial key to generate 
group keys. The leaf nodes generate random numbers to calculate their partial keys. 
The partial keys of parent nodes are calculated by the partial keys of the leaf nodes. 
There are two types of group keys: intra-cluster key and inter-cluster key. The 
intra-cluster group key is used for encryption/decryption of messages inside a sensor 
network group, whereas the inter-cluster group key is used for groups of cluster 
heads. A cluster head computes the intra-cluster group key by using all the partial 
keys in the group as arguments. The inter-cluster group key is generated in the same 
approach by using the partial keys of cluster heads. 
 
This scheme is simple and easy to implement. The energy consumption is 
reasonable as Panja analyzed. If the size of cluster and partial key is small, the 
memory usage and computation costs can be reduced. It also satisfies the requirement 
scalability, accessibility and flexibility. But the scheme has weaknesses too. In Panja 
the group size decides the key strength, if the group is small, the key would be weak.  
But if the group size or partial key is bigger, there would be more computation and 
memory cost. Another drawback of Panja is the scheme only supports one type of key. 
If one node is compromised, the key which shared by the group of nodes would be 
disclosed and all nodes in the same group are in danger. 
 
2.4.4. LEAP Scheme 
LEAP (Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol) [34] is a key 
management protocol with the operation of four types of keys: individual key, 
pairwise key, cluster key and group key. The individual key is for each node shared 
with base station. A pairwise key shared with another node. The cluster key shared 
with a node and all its neighbors. And group key is for base station communicates 
with all other sensor nodes in the network. These four keys are generated by a 
pre-distributed key called initial key. Firstly, the individual key is calculated by a 
function with the ID of the node. Secondly, nodes broadcast their IDs in the neighbor 
discovering phase and the receiver uses a function with initial key to establish the 
pairwise key shared with the neighbor. Then all nodes delete the initial key after the 
pairwise key generation phase. Next is cluster key distribution. A node secures the key 
with the pairwise key and broadcasts it to all neighbors. Lastly, the base station 
broadcasts the group key cluster by cluster. 
 
LEAP uses μTimed Efficient Streaming Loss-tolerant Authentication Protocol 
(μTESLA) [40] to authenticate the broadcast of base station which make sure that 
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packet with group key is just sent by base station. The authentication for cluster key is 
a scheme called one-way hash-key chain.  
 
LEAP has many advantages. It provides security services for different types of 
packet. It also meets the requirement of accessibility. However LEAP failed to satisfy 
the flexibility requirement because it assumes a static network. There is no node 
addition in this scheme. In addition, if initial key is disclosed, the adversary will be 
able to establish pairwise key with any node in the network. 
 
2.4.5. Time-based Key Management Scheme 
Jang [41] tried to improve LEAP and proposed a scheme which splits the network 
lifetime into P slots and every slot has an initial key. All nodes deployed in the same 
slot i are in the group Ni, they have the same initial key IKi and n master keys of n 
time slots which are chosen randomly. The master key helps nodes to calculate the 
initial keys of nodes in different slots. Then based on LEAP, the individual key, 
pairwise key, cluster key and group key can be generated. Figure 6 shows key 
materials pre-loaded to nodes at different time slots in the scheme 
 
 
Figure 6: Key materials pre-loaded to nodes at different time slots in the scheme 
 
Time-based scheme has a stronger initial key than LEAP because it uses different 
ones in different slots. But the master keys in one group are chosen randomly, it led to 
cost of computation and energy because when a node attempts to communicate with 
another one in different slot, it may go through many other nodes in different slots. 
Furthermore Jang did not solve the flexibility problem of LEAP.  
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2.4.6. TLA Scheme 
Maala [42] proposed a key management scheme with two-level structure.  It 
combined the key management mechanisms in each level. The techniques are: master 
key technique, pairwise key technique and key pool technique. Master key is a unique 
key which is pre-distributed and shared by all nodes in the network. Pairwise key is 
pre-distributed and shared by a pair of nodes. Each pair of nodes shared a different 
key. The key pool technique is similar with Eschenauer that each node randomly 
chooses and stores a subset of keys form the key pool as their key rings, then two 
nodes secure their communication by the same key in their key rings. The scheme 
divides the wireless sensor network into two types of clusters: supervised and 
unsupervised clusters. The supervised cluster has a supervisor node and a group of 
supervised nodes, while the unsupervised cluster only has unsupervised nodes without 
security requirements. The combined master and pairwise key technique is used in the 
supervised cluster while the key pool technique is used in unsupervised cluster. 
 
The advantage of TLA is its capability against node capture. In addition the 
memory cost is reasonable. But when network expend and has more sensor nodes, the 
power consumption increases. It does not mention the nodes addition and revocation 
too. Lastly, nodes should be replaced after captured, however it is not covered in the 
scheme. 
 
2.4.7. ECDH for Zigbee Pro 
This mechanism [36] applies and improves the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman 
(ECDH) key distribution scheme [43] for Zigbee Pro [44]. Zigbee Pro is a popular 
industrial standard of wireless sensor networks. It has three types of keys: master key, 
network key and link key. Master key authenticates the new node, generates link keys 
in application layer. Network key is shared by all nodes for broadcast. Master key and 
network key are pre- installed. Link key is pairwise key and uses for end-to-end 
encryption. It could be pre-installed or generated by master key. 
 
ECDH for Zigbee Pro improved security level. It provides confidentiality, 
authentication and integrity. It also prevents man- in-the-middle attack using subMAC 
and replay attack. The mechanism also provides the almost same efficiency with 
Zigbee Pro. But, this scheme can only be used on Zigbee based wireless sensor 
network.  
 
2.4.8. Research Questions 
Based on analysis of current research situation and existing schemes, some of the 
problems are found. 
 
1. Lack of criteria for key management scheme evaluation, especially on security. 
Most schemes analyze security by descriptive words in paragraphs which are  
 25 
 
hard to compare with other schemes. It is also difficult to assess whether a 
scheme is good or not.  
2. There is no method to solve problems caused by cluster head compromise. In 
hierarchical wireless sensor networks, it is impossible for base station to 
control all nodes in the network. This leads to significance of cluster head in 
efficient control of the whole network. However the importance of the cluster 
head makes it easy to be a target, and in most schemes, it is not mentioned that 
how to protect normal nodes after cluster head compromise. 
3. High cost on security service of key update. Key update is an important 
method to keep secrecy of keys. To ensure keys are not disclosed after node 
replacement, revocation and compromise, the keys known by the node should 
be renewed. But key update includes key establishment and distribution which 
require lots of resources. As limitation of wireless sensor networks, costs of 
key update need to be reduced. 
 
According to the above problems, the research questions are proposed. They are: 
• How can the criteria be established to assess the security and efficiency of key 
management schemes? 
• How can the security of other nodes in the same cluster be strengthened when 
the cluster head is compromised in hierarchical wireless sensor networks? 
• How can the existing key update algorithm on hierarchical wireless sensor 
network be improved on efficiency? 
 
2.5. Summary 
In this chapter, a survey of existing key management schemes is presented and 
several popular schemes are analyzed. Firstly, the key management requirements 
which include security, efficiency and operation are introduced. Then the key 
management schemes are classified based on different characteristics of wireless 
sensor networks. After that, several popular schemes are introduced, the advantages 
and drawbacks of which are pointed out. Finally the common problems of current  
research are concluded, based on which the research questions are proposed. 
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3. The Criteria for Key Management Scheme 
Assessment 
3.1. Introduction 
Key management is important for wireless sensor networks and researchers 
proposed many schemes. In the last chapter, many key management schemes are 
introduced and analyzed. However it is hard for a user who is not in this area to assess 
a scheme. In order to facilitate users, key management scheme’s preliminary criteria, 
especially security criteria are proposed in this chapter. Firstly, the constraints of 
wireless sensor networks and requirements of key management are summarized. Then 
there is an explanation of how key management works in a network, which includes 
initialization of keys, key generation and distribution, key management for node 
operations and actions in scenario of node compromise. Next the preliminary criteria 
of key management assessment are proposed. Security criteria include keying model, 
key distribution, key update, node operation and resilience. Efficient criteria include 
computation, communication and memory costs. The operation criteria are flexibility, 
scalability and accessibility. 
3.2. The Requirement of Wireless Sensor Networks Key 
Management Schemes 
As it is introduced in chapter 1 and 2, because of constraints of wireless sensor 
networks, the design of key management scheme has to consider security, efficiency 
and operation requirements. Thus key management scheme assessment also has to 
consider these three aspects. So there are three types of criteria: security, efficiency 
and operation criteria. Firstly, there are five aspects in security criterion: keying model, 
key distribution, key update, node operation, resilience. In the other hand, efficiency 
is easy to assess because the cost of energy and memory can be quantified. Simulation 
tools can evaluate schemes and calculation results are accurate data of energy and 
time consumption. At last, operation aspect should be considered as the capabilities of 
flexibility, scalability and accessibility. 
3.3. Process of Key Management 
3.3.1. Pre-distributed Keys 
In order to provide efficient solutions to satisfy key management requirements, 
pre-distribution of keys is proposed which is loading keys into sensor nodes before 
deployment of nodes [18, 30, 45]. However, pre-distributed keying can cause 
problems due to its inflexibility in changing mission configurations. There are two 
types of popular used pre-distributed keying approaches. 
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3.3.1.1. Network-Wide Pre-distributed Keying  
One of the simplest and most efficient approaches is network-wide pre-distributed 
keying [18]. Each node in the network is pre- loaded with the same keying material 
before deployment. Sometimes the number of keying material can be more than one 
which is depended on different requirements of application. Because each node in the 
network has the same keying material, keys for confidentiality and authentication can 
be generated conveniently with low cost on communication or computation.  
 
However, network-wide pre-distributed keying may cause some problems. Firstly, 
it is not secure enough for some applications, for example, military scenarios. 
Enemies can easily get confidentiality keys that all nodes in the network employed by 
compromising only one node. The future and past recorded communications are 
potentially exposed to enemies.   
3.3.1.2. Node-Specific Pre-distributed Keying  
The node-specific pre-distributed keying [18] is the approach that the key shared by 
specific nodes is calculated and pre- loaded into these nodes before their deployment. 
Then these nodes are able to establish communication by the pre-distributed key. This 
approach provides strong security since the key is shared by specific nodes, thus 
adversary can only access these nodes, and other nodes in the network are still 
secured. Besides the approach costs very few energy on nodes. 
 
But node-specific pre-distributed keying cannot satisfy flexibility and scalability. 
Because a deployed node only has the capability to communicate with nodes which 
share the same key with it, it is complex for people to arrange the position of each 
node during node deployment. If a node is surrounded by nodes sharing the different 
key, the node cannot join network due to disable of communication. 
3.3.2. Key Establishment and Key Distribution 
Establishing a cryptographic key between two or more participants requires two 
basic steps [18]. The first one is establishing trust between the participating entities. 
The second is computation of the cryptographic key. Both steps have unique 
requirements for maintaining key confidentiality, providing sufficient authentication 
and integrity protection, providing availability, etc. 
 
In most key management schemes, the first step is done by the pre- installed keying 
materials. This is an efficient and secure approach to establish trust between nodes as 
it is presented in the last section. Security of the scheme without pre-distributed 
keying materials is critical as any untrusted entity is able to join the network. Some 
schemes employ public key cryptography (PKC) [46] based mechanisms to provide 
confidentiality and authentication. PKC based mechanism [47, 48] is asymmetric-key 
algorithms which the encryption key is different from decryption key. The ma in 
advantage of PKC based mechanism is strong security since each pair of public key 
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and private key is unique. But asymmetric algorithm always consumes much more 
resources than symmetric algorithm. The employment of PKC based mechanism 
should consider the resources costs on each node. 
 
After trust establishment of participating entities, the cryptographic key can be 
computed. Some schemes generate pseudo-random numbers as keys due to 
convenience, but the security of the key is highly rely on randomness of  
pseudo-random number generation algorithm. Other schemes employ different 
algorithms to generate keys such as Diffie-Hellman.  
 
Key distribution is to deliver keys from the key generator node to other nodes 
sharing the keys. It is the next step after key establishment. In some schemes, nodes 
do not distribute keys directly; instead, they distribute seeds to generate keys. This is 
an efficient approach to improve security of keys. 
 
3.3.3. Key Management in Node Operation 
In most wireless sensor networks, especially large scale and long lifetime 
applications, there are many situations require node operations. For example, a sensor 
node has to be replaced when its battery run out. And if a node is compromised, it has 
to be removed from the network. Thus key management schemes should be flexible in 
node addition, revocation and replacement. On the other hand, sensor nodes usually 
are deployed in outdoor field without surveillance, therefore they are easy to be 
captured by potential adversary. These compromised nodes should be removed from 
the network with consideration of network security. Key management scheme should 
support approach for node compromise too. 
 Node addition: Node addition is adding new nodes into a deployed network. 
It is usually caused by expansion of the network or replacement of nodes with 
issues. Since only authorized nodes can join the network to maintain security, 
the new node has to pre-distribute at least some of the same keying material 
with the deployed nodes which helps it to be authenticated. After joining 
network, the newly joined node generates or receives other currently employed 
keys to establish communication with other nodes in the network.  
 Node revocation: Node revocation is to remove nodes from a network. Once a 
node has problems such as power depletion, damage and compromise by 
adversary, the node has to be removed from the network for security and 
efficiency reasons. A node always contains confidentiality keys of the network 
which need to be updated after revocation of the node, to ensure backward 
secrecy of the network. 
 Node replacement: Node replacement is to replace an old node with a new 
node due to problems of the old node such as energy exhaustion. Usually it 
includes addition of a new node and revocation of the old node. All keys that 
the replaced node has should be renewed after node replacement. 
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3.3.4. Key Update 
In order to secure the forward and backward secrecy of wireless sensor networks, 
some potentially disclosed keys have to be replaced by new ones [49]. The process of 
establishment and distribution of new keys to renew the unsecured keys is key update. 
It usually happens after node revocation, replacement and compromise. In some 
applications that the wireless sensor networks deployed in a hostile environment such 
as military battle fields, some frequently used keys are possibly analyzed and 
calculated by enemies after sometime. In order to prevent it, these keys should be 
updated regularly to keep the secrecy. Key update is to establish and distribute a new 
key, so the resources cost is depended on key establishment and distribution algorithm. 
Besides, key update is different from key renew after node compromise which will be 
introduced in the next section, the aim of key update is to renew a key before 
adversary getting the key by analysis even the key is not compromised yet. 
 
3.3.5. Node Compromise 
Node compromise is an active attack which can cause confidentiality fail [1]. 
Generally, an adversary captures a node and digs out data in it. In another hand, the 
adversary is able to derive the data in a node by analyzing data got from other 
compromised nodes. The adversary can launch more attacks by controlling these 
compromised nodes. Thus the compromised nodes should be removed from the 
network as soon as possible. The keys that compromised nodes have are disclosed and 
cannot be used anymore. They need to be renewed in a safe way after detection of a 
compromised node. Intrusion detection [50] is essential during this process. 
 
3.4. Criteria for Security Assessment 
In current research, researchers evaluate their schemes by descriptions which can 
be not convincing but difficult to find by readers who are not in the area, especially 
normal users of wireless sensor network application. In order to solve the problem,  
preliminary criteria of security are established in this section by different process of 
key management to assess security strength of a key management scheme. The 
proposed criteria assess security of a scheme from keying model, key distribution, key 
update, node operation and resilience. Each of aspect is quantized as 20 points. The 
total score is 100 and the scheme has higher score is more secure than the one gets 
lower score. 
 
3.4.1. Keying Model 
Keying Models are introduced in section 2.2. They are pairwise keying model, 
group keying model and network keying model. Pairwise key provides encryption for 
messages between two specific nodes which cannot be decrypted by any others. Thus 
compromise this key by an adversary may lead to disclosure of communications 
between two nodes. In addition, a group key protects communication of a group of 
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nodes. Therefore if one node of the group is compromised, the communication of the 
whole group is potentially disclosing. Network key is one key shared by all nodes in 
the network. An adversary is able to eavesdrop on the whole network by 
compromising only one node. In conclusion, group keying model provides higher 
security strength than network keying model, but lower security than pairwise key. 
 
In current research, a key management scheme usually employs at least one of the 
keying models. The scheme employs one keying model is a single model scheme 
while the scheme employs more than one keying model is a mix model scheme. In 
mixed model scheme, pairwise key is often employed by specific nodes and works 
with group key or network key. Conventionally, a mix model scheme is securer than a 
single model scheme. But single model scheme which employ pairwise key between 
each node has very strong security too. Table 3 shows the keying model criterion of 
key management. 
Table 3: The keying model criterion 
Keying model Detail Security score 
(20/20) 
Conclusion of 
security strength 
Single model 
scheme 
Network key 5 Weak 
Group key 10 Normal 
Pairwise key 20 Very strong 
Mixed model 
scheme 
Network key and 
pairwise key 
15 Strong 
Three types of 
key 
20 Very strong 
 
3.4.2. Key Distribution 
Key distribution is to transmit keys from generator to other node sharing them 
which is potentially eavesdropping by adversaries. Thus the distributed keying 
materials should be encrypted to prevent them from being disclosed. A scheme also 
can employ algorithms such as Diffie-Hellman which is able to keep security even the 
keying material is eavesdropped.  
 
As a criterion of security, a scheme should provide encryption for key distribution 
basically. Furthermore in situation of node compromise, a secure scheme provides 
encryption by a key which is not shared by the compromised node. Moreover, secret 
seeds exchange is a secure approach too. Table 4 shows the key distribution criterion. 
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Table 4: The key distribution criterion 
Key 
distribution 
Detail Security 
score (20/20) 
Conclusion of 
security strength 
Directly 
key 
distribution 
Basic encryption 5 Weak 
Encryption by different 
key 
20 Very strong 
Secret 
seed 
exchange 
Exchange seeds which 
cannot calculate the key 
20 Very strong 
 
3.4.3. Key Update 
Key update service protects the forward and backward secrecy of the network. In 
key update, the distribution of keys after node operations and compromise should be 
different for regular key update. In regular key update, new key can be encrypted by 
old key because it only prevent potential adversary from analyzing old key. However 
the aim of the specific key update after node revocation, replacement and compromise 
is to prevent the removed or compromised node from receiving following message by 
old keys. So the distribution of specific update has to be protected by a key besides 
old keys. Table 5 shows the key update criterion. 
Table 5: The key update criterion 
Key update Detail Security score 
(20/20) 
Conclusion of 
security strength 
Regular update Just regular 
update 
10 Normal 
Specific update Just specific 
update 
10 Normal 
Both 
approaches 
Both regular and 
specific update 
20 Very strong 
 
3.4.4. Node Operation 
It provides services to meet operation requirement of wireless sensor networks 
which should include keying services for node addition, revocation and replacement. 
Table 6 shows the node operation criterion. 
3.4.5. Resilience 
This is the resilience against node compromise which is the capability to keep 
secrecy of keys after one node compromise. If some keys are disclosed and the whole 
network is in danger after node compromise, the resilience is weak; if the 
compromised keys lead to potential danger to parts of nodes, the security is normal; 
and if the compromised keys can be update safely, the security is very strong. Table 7 
shows the resilience criterion. 
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Table 6: The node operation criterion 
Node operation Detail Security 
score (20/20) 
Conclusion of 
security strength 
Node addition Key establishment and 
distribution for new node 
10 Normal 
Node revocation Key erasure and update 
after node revocation 
10 Normal 
Node 
replacement 
Both 20 Very strong 
 
Table 7: The resilience criterion 
Resilience after node 
compromise(nodes in 
danger) 
Detail Security 
score (20/20) 
Conclusion of 
security strength 
Whole network Whole network is 
in danger 
5 Weak 
Parts of nodes Parts of nodes 10 Normal 
None The keys can be 
updated safely 
20 Very strong 
 
3.5. Criteria for Efficiency and Operation 
Besides security, the assessment of a key management scheme includes efficiency 
and operation due to requirements of key management in wireless sensor networks. 
 
The criteria of efficiency have been established and admitted by the public. The 
general efficiency includes energy cost and memory cost. Energy consumption of a 
scheme depends on computation and communication cost while memory cost is 
related to number of keys stored in each node. The efficiency of a scheme is easy to 
assess because there are many simulation tools to help researchers to calculate costs 
of different resources. For computation, there are two parts: key calculation, which is 
the energy for key generation, and cryptography which is the energy for encryption 
and decryption of keying materials. Communication cost is the energy consumes for 
transportation of message exchange to generate and distribute keys. Conventionally, 
communication cost much more energy than computation [51]. On the other hand, 
memory cost is the space needed for key storage. The more keys a node holds, the 
more memory is required. And the required space increases when the key size grows. 
 
Wireless sensor networks require flexibility, scalability and accessibility [52] which 
can be denoted as operation requirement. Key management schemes should be 
assessed in these too. Flexibility mostly depends on whether the scheme supports 
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node operation or not. In another words, the scheme with flexibility should provide 
node addition, revocation and replacement. Scalability is the scheme should support 
large scale of network, usually hierarchical structure is better than flat structure. 
Accessibility is each node is able to communication with each other. In key 
management, this feature is more depends on keying model. For single keying model 
schemes, network key is shared by all nodes, thus it has very good accessibility. In a 
scheme which employs group key, if it does not have any group shares no common 
node with other groups, the scheme has good accessibility too. In pairwise keying 
model scheme, if all nodes share pairwise key with each other, the accessibility is 
good. But if the pairwise key is partly employed in the network without other types of 
keys, the accessibility is critical. The key establishment approach also may cause 
critical accessibility too. For example, in Eschenaue scheme, people doubt its 
accessibility because not any pair of nodes is able to establish a shared key. Therefore, in 
mixed model schemes, only group key and pairwise key mixed schemes have to 
consider the accessibility carefully since both keying model may have accessible 
problem. 
 
3.6. The Security Assessment for Panja and LEAP 
Panja and LEAP are two popular key management schemes in current research. The 
two schemes are analyzed based on security criteria in this section. Panja only 
supports group key and basic encryption. It mentions both specific and regular update. 
The node operations are supported in this scheme. The resilience of Panja is not good. 
On the other hand, LEAP supports all keying models, the distribution of keys are 
securely carried out by different keys. The resilience against node compromise is 
good as all keys can update securely. But LEAP does not mention regular key update 
and node addition is unavailable. Thus LEAP has much higher score than Panja, its 
security is stronger than Panja. Table 8 shows the security assessment for the two 
schemes. 
Table 8: The security assessment of LEAP and Panja 
Security criteria LEAP Panja 
Keying model (20) All (20) Group key only (10) 
Key distribution (20) Encryption by different 
key (20) 
Basic encryption (5) 
Key update (20) Specific update (10) Specific and regular 
update (20) 
Node operation (20) No addition (10) All (20) 
Resilience (20) Security update (20) Not good (10) 
Total (100) 80 65 
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3.7. Summary 
In this chapter, criteria for key management scheme assessment are proposed, 
which considers key management requirements of security, efficiency and operation. 
The preliminary criteria of security are proposed based on process of key management 
includes keying model, key distribution, key update, actions in node operation and 
resilience against node compromise. The current efficiency criteria are described. 
Memory cost and energy consumption of key calculation, cryptography and 
communication are the main efficiency measurement. The assessments of operation 
requirement in flexibility, scalability and accessibility are shown as well. In the next 
chapter, the structure of a wireless sensor networks is introduced and assistant node 
which is to improve security of a cluster after cluster head compromise is presented. 
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4. Cluster Based Wireless Sensor Networks and Key 
Management 
Cluster based hierarchical wireless sensor network is a big category of wireless 
sensor networks with many potential applications [1]. In these networks, cluster heads 
not only aggregate application data, but also take management role which covers the 
security operations including the key management. Most existing key management 
schemes for hierarchical wireless sensor networks are based on the assumption that 
cluster heads are safe and reliable. However, in real world, cluster headers like normal 
nodes, can also be compromised. In this chapter, a modification on the cluster based 
hierarchical wireless sensor networks structure is provided by introducing a new 
management node in each cluster.  This new management node is called assistant  
node. The introduction of assistant nodes is to handle the scenario when cluster heads 
are compromised.    
 
4.1. Network Architecture 
A sensor network typically consists of a large number of sensor nodes densely 
deployed in a region of interest, and one or more data sinks or base stations that are 
located close to or inside the sensing region. The base station sends queries or 
commands to the sensor nodes in the sensing region while the sensor nodes cooperate 
to accomplish the required task and send the sensed data to the base station. 
Meanwhile, the base station also serves as a gateway to outside networks, for example, 
the Internet. Base station collects data from the sensor nodes, performs simple 
processing on the collected data, and then sends relevant information (or the 
processed data) via the Internet to the users who requested it or use the information.  
 
In wireless sensor networks, each sensor node can use single-hop long-distance 
transmission to send data to the base station. But long-distance transmission is 
expensive in energy consumption. In a sensor network, the energy cost on 
communication is much higher than it on computation. For example, the energy 
consumed for transferring one bit of data to a receiver at 100 m away is equal to that 
needed to execute 3,000 instructions [51]. The ratio of energy consumption for 
communicating 1 bit over the wireless medium to that for processing the same bit 
could be in the range of 1,000 – 10,000 [20, 53]. In addition, transmission energy cost 
dominates the total communication cost. The transmission energy cost increases 
exponentially with the growing transmission distance. Thus decreases of transmission 
distance and amount of communication are able to help reduce energy cost and 
prolong the lifetime of a network. 
 
Therefore, the multi-hop short-distance transmission is a reasonable approach. In 
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most wireless sensor networks, nodes are densely deployed. Their neighbor nodes are 
close to each other and this provides possibility to use short-distance transmission. In 
this transmission, a sensor node transmits its data to the base station through one or 
more intermediate nodes. This reduces energy cost compares with data transmission 
from the node directly to the base station. The architecture of a multi-hop network can 
be classified as flat and hierarchical network [2, 54]. 
 
In a flat wireless sensor network, each node plays the same role to accomplish the 
required task. In order to collect required data, the base station sends a command to 
all nodes in the sensing region and the nodes that have the matching data to the 
command response the base station. Each node transmits data through multi-hop to 
the base station and uses other nodes as routers. Figure 7 shows a flat network. 
 
 
Figure 7: A flat wireless sensor network 
 
In a hierarchical network, all sensor nodes are organized into clusters. Each cluster 
consists of cluster members and a cluster head. Cluster members send their data to the 
cluster head while cluster heads collect and aggregate data from member nodes, and 
then transmit data to the base station. This approach is able to reduce energy cost on 
communication and balance traffic load. Furthermore, data aggregation at cluster 
heads can help to reduce the amount of transmission as well as improve the efficiency 
of the network [2]. Figure 8 shows a hierarchical network. In a heterogeneous 
network [55] which consists of sensor nodes with different capabilities, cluster heads 
can be the nodes with higher resources in communication and computation. The 
capability of a node decides whether it is a normal member node or a cluster head. 
The deployment of this type of network should consider the locations of cluster heads 
and normal nodes. However in a homogeneous network which consists of nodes with 
the same capability, cluster head selection can be complex. In order to organize sensor 
nodes into cluster in a reasonable way to achieve efficiency, researchers have 
proposed many clustering algorithms. 
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Figure 8: A hierarchical wireless sensor network 
 
4.2. Node Clustering  
As it is introduced in the last section, node clustering in wireless sensor networks 
has many advantages including less energy cost due to data aggregation, less routing 
information in normal nodes, more sleeping time for normal nodes and convenience 
in network management which is able to provide better scalability. However in a real 
wireless ad hoc environment, clustering algorithms face limitations such as unreliable 
and limited communication channel, and network topology changing. The clustering 
algorithms have to overcome these limitations.  
 
LEACH (low-energy adaptive clustering hierarchy) [56] is the earliest node 
clustering algorithm in wireless sensor networks. Many other algorithms are proposed 
based on it such as TEEN (threshold sensitive energy efficient sensor network  
protocol) [57], HEED (hybrid energy-efficient distributed clustering) [58] and etc. 
There are many other algorithms different from LEACH such as ACE (algorithm for 
cluster establishment) [59] and LSCP (lightweight sensing and communication 
protocol) [60] . 
 
The main steps of all these node clustering algorithms include: (1) cluster head 
selection; (2) cluster forming; (3) routing of nodes. In a node clustering algorithm, 
firstly cluster heads are chosen from the network. Cluster head selection is very 
important because appropriate cluster head selection can reduce the rate of 
re-clustering [61]. Then a cluster can be constituted by the cluster head and normal 
nodes affiliated to it. Nodes at the edge of a cluster are gateway nodes, which is able 
to communicate with other clusters. After the setup of clustering, the configuration of 
it can be changed if any node moves or network topology changes. 
 
Cluster head selection is the basic of node clustering and also the first step of a 
clustering algorithm. In some heterogeneous network [62] clustering algorithms, 
cluster heads are pre-specified and deployed where they have unlimited energy 
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resources. But in homogeneous node clustering algorithms, cluster heads are nodes 
with limited resources and nodes have the same capability. In order to prolong the 
lifetime of a network, cluster heads are re-selected periodically. The selection 
algorithm decides the number and location of cluster heads in a network which affects 
number, size and structure of clusters, and therefore decides the lifetime of the 
network. The current cluster head selection algorithms are proposed depending on 
four features: the remained energy, the distance between the node to the base station, 
the deployment of the node (includes the coverage and connectivity to other nodes) 
and communication cost inside the cluster.  
 
Cluster heads are the most important nodes in their clusters. Cluster head related 
operation can be summarized in the following [63]. 
  
 Efficient organization: In a large scale hierarchical wireless sensor network, it 
is very resource consuming for base station to communicate directly with all 
normal nodes in the network. However, through cluster heads the network can 
efficiently organize all normal nodes and base station can efficiently 
communicate with normal nodes. 
 Data aggregation: Neighboring nodes can easily collect highly correlated data, 
in order to reduce redundant data transmission in the network, data aggregation 
is essential. Cluster heads usually process data aggregation as all data from 
normal member nodes have to pass through heads. 
 Security management: Cluster heads usually generate and distribute security 
keys. For example, in Panja scheme, cluster heads generate and distribute 
group key of the cluster. Once cluster head is compromised, the whole cluster 
will be in danger because all keys in cluster head are disclosed and there is no 
node in the cluster can update the key. 
 
As a cluster head plays such important roles, the compromise of a cluster head is 
fatal in the cluster and it affects all the nodes in the cluster. In order to combat the 
security problem caused by cluster head compromise, an assistant node based 
management is proposed. 
 
4.3. Assistant Node in Hierarchical Wireless Sensor 
Networks 
In a cluster, besides the cluster head, another management node, named assistant 
node (AS) is arranged. An assistant node is randomly chosen by the cluster head at 
cluster setup phase. It should have pairwise keys with each member nodes and the 
cluster head. The pairwise key establishment will be covered in the next chapter. All 
member nodes in the cluster are candidates to be an assistant node. Whenever a 
 39 
 
cluster head is compromised, replaced or removed, the assistant node will kick in and 
will take the management role in the cluster. F igure 9 shows assistant nodes in a 
three-layer wireless sensor network. 
  
 
Figure 9: Assistant nodes in a three- layer hierarchical wireless sensor network 
An assistant node has IDs of all nodes in the same cluster as well as the information 
of gateway nodes. The gateway nodes enable the assistant node to find routes to the 
upper level head above its own cluster head in the hierarchical structure.  
 
In heterogeneous networks, there is no need for re-clustering as cluster heads have 
enough resources and they are selected before deployment. After cluster setup, cluster 
head randomly chooses a normal node as the assistant node. The cluster head sends 
IDs of all the other nodes and information of gateway nodes to the assistant node.  
 
The assistant node finds a route to the head above its own cluster head at clustering 
stage in 6 steps:  
1) Initialization  
 Set Searching Depth to 0; 
 Create two route request packets with the following parameters 
i. Cluster head ID ( source CH ID)  
ii. Routing Path : Assistant Node ID 
iii. Searching Depth 
2) Assistant node passes the requests packet to a gateway node never encountered 
before. 
3) The gateway node adds its own ID to the routing path and sends the request to 
a gateway node in a neighboring cluster.  
4) Then this neighboring gateway node adds its own ID to the Routing Path and 
passes the request packet to its cluster head.  
5) Each time a cluster head receives a request, it will increase Searching Depth by 
1. Then it will check if the source CH ID is its member. If it is, then the route is 
found. Otherwise it will check if Search Depth is larger than 3. If it is then go 
back to step 1. Otherwise it adds its ID to the Routing Path and passes the 
request to its own head, then goes back to step5.  
6) End.  
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Figure 10 (a) shows the routing when assistant node is a gateway node. In (a), route 
1 is able to reach the head of cluster head, so it should be the route return to the node 
A. However in Figure 10 (b) route 1 is failed because the cluster of node B is at the 
fringe of the higher- layer cluster and its neighbor belongs to another head of cluster 
heads. Thus route 1 is a wrong route and route 2 would be setup after the failure of 
route 1. 
 
 
Figure 10: Routing from assistant nodes to head of cluster heads 
In homogeneous network, since all sensor nodes have the same capability, the 
network has to re-cluster periodically to distribute energy overhead evenly on all 
nodes [64, 65]. If an assistant node always tries to find a route to the head of its 
cluster head after each re-clustering, the energy consumption of routing for assistant 
nodes would be too much. Thus in homogeneous network, assistant nodes remember 
information of the gateway nodes in the same cluster.  It will find routes to the head of 
cluster head when the cluster head is compromised or damaged. The routing approach 
is similar with the one in a heterogeneous network, but the response from the head of 
cluster head should include the information of whether the member nodes join the 
other cluster or wait for a new cluster head to replace the old one. 
 
In this assistant node management, an assistant node is able to connect other 
member nodes in the cluster securely. Once a compromised cluster head i is detected, 
the assistant node in the cluster is able to communicate with the head j above its own 
cluster head i by pairwise key. This head j is the leader of i and should be able to 
manage i and other cluster heads in the same layer with i. If there is a newly adding 
node k to replace the compromised node i, the new node k would receive a temporary 
group key GK from cluster head j after join its cluster. Head j also sends GK and 
command to join the cluster of node k to the assistant node. Then the assistant node 
distributes the GK and command in the cluster secured by pairwise key with each 
member node. Member nodes can join the cluster of head k after authenticated by GK. 
If there is no new node to replace the compromised head i, head j sends GK to i’s 
neighboring cluster heads. The assistant node receives GK and command to join 
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neighbor clusters, and then distributes them in the cluster. Member nodes can join the 
nearest cluster. This approach helps member nodes to get out of control from the 
compromised cluster head. 
 
4.4. Summary 
In this chapter, the architecture of wireless sensor networks is first introduced. A 
network usually consists of a base station and many sensor nodes which can be 
structured as a flat network or a hierarchical network. Then general node clustering 
algorithms in hierarchical networks are presented. The main steps of algorithms are  
almost the same, which include cluster head selection, cluster forming and routing. 
After that, the assistant node management is proposed and its evaluation is presented 
too. In the next chapter, a newly proposed key management scheme will be proposed 
and assistant node management is applied in the new scheme. 
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5. The Secure Efficient Hierarchical Key 
Management Scheme 
5.1.   Introduction 
The existing key management schemes are analyzed in the previous chapters. In 
this chapter, a new secure efficient key management scheme for hierarchical wireless 
sensor networks is proposed based on LEAP [34] and Panja [39]. LEAP is a mix 
model scheme while Panja is a single model scheme in hierarchical networks. The 
proposed scheme has kept the good features of both schemes. LEAP is a better 
scheme in supporting services to secure different types of communication. In wireless 
sensor networks there are many communication types, such as base station broadcast 
messages to all network nodes, cluster multicast messages to all cluster members and 
unicasts messages from member node to cluster head. LEAP provides four types of 
keys to secure different communication types. One problem of LEAP is that it is not 
flexible because it assumes a static network and it is not efficient. Panja is the key 
management scheme supporting establishment of group key in hierarchical structure 
of wireless sensor networks. This structure helps to reduce message transmission due 
to data fusion at cluster heads. So it is more efficient than flat structure. Panja is more 
efficient but its security is weak. It only supports one type of key, and thus if the key 
is compromised, the whole network will be in danger. A key management scheme 
needs to satisfy security, efficiency and operation requirements and it is hard to find 
one scheme to achieve all of them at the same time. Based on recent researches and 
the key management assessment criteria proposed in chapter 3 which have shown that 
key generation, distribution, update and node operations are significant to a key 
management scheme. In this chapter, LEAP and Panja are analyzed in detail. Then a 
new scheme is proposed. Key generation, distribution, update and node operations of 
the proposed scheme are clearly described.  
 
5.2. Analysis of Existing Schemes 
In this section, two schemes, ie Panja and LEAP are analyzed and their problems are 
outlined. For each scheme, the operation of key generation, distribution and update are 
described. The advantages and weaknesses of the schemes are also analyzed.  
 
5.2.1. Problem of Panja 
Panja is a dynamic single model key management scheme. It only includes one type 
of key: group key. This key is shared by a group of nodes which is a cluster. Each 
node in the cluster contributes a partial number to generate the group key. Leaf nodes 
generate random numbers as their partial numbers. Then the parent of the leaf nodes 
computes its partial number using a function. In Figure 11, the leaf nodes 
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are 𝑀1, 𝑀2, …, 𝑀9. To start, 𝑀1 computes the partial key 𝑓(𝑆1) and broadcasts it.  
The parent node  𝑀10 gets the partial keys from  𝑀1 and other children. Here, f is a 
generator algorithm using g from the multiplicative group ZP* (i.e. the set {1, 2… 
p−1}, p is the prime) and 𝑆1 is a randomly chosen secret number for member 𝑀1.  
 𝑓(𝑘) = 𝑔𝑘  mod 𝑝 5.1 
Likewise, member  𝑀2 computes 𝑓(𝑆2)and broadcasts it, and the parent  𝑀10  
gets the partial keys. In this way, member  𝑀10  receives 𝑓(𝑆1), 𝑓(𝑆2), 𝑓(𝑆3), and 
raises the power by 𝑆10 to get the intermediate key 𝐼𝐾1. Here, 𝑓(𝑆10) is the partial 
key contribution of  𝑀10 . 𝐼𝐾1 is generated d by 𝑓(𝑆1), 𝑓(𝑆2), 𝑓(𝑆3)and 𝑓(𝑆10).  
𝐼𝐾1 = 𝑓(𝑓(𝑠1),𝑓(𝑠2), 𝑓(𝑠3),𝑓(𝑠10)) = 𝑔
𝑓 (𝑠1)𝑓(𝑠2)𝑓(𝑠3)𝑓(𝑠10)  mod 𝑝 5.2 
The intermediate keys in  𝑀10 , 𝑀11 , and  𝑀12  are 𝐼𝐾1, 𝐼𝐾2 and 𝐼𝐾3, they are 
generated by the partial keys of member nodes. The intermediate keys are encrypted 
using a one-time symmetric key at the first time. The following ones are encrypted by 
the last group keys. The cluster head generates the group key K, using 𝐼𝐾1, 𝐼𝐾2 and 
𝐼𝐾3 and its contribution 𝑓(𝑆13).  
 𝐾 = 𝑔𝐼𝐾1 𝐼𝐾2 𝐼𝐾3𝑓(𝑆13 )  mod 𝑝 5.3 
Figure 11 shows the structure of Panja. 
 
Figure 11: Panja scheme 
Panja also includes group key updating. The approach to keep the key fresh is by 
re-keying the group at fixed intervals; in this approach the partial keys and the group key 
will be computed again. The group key establishment uses the described algorithm 
 44 
 
above which is secure but not efficient as it costs too much energy on communication. 
Firstly, BS broadcasts the key update request to all cluster heads, and then cluster 
heads broadcast the message to all member nodes. Secondly, member nodes send 
partial numbers to cluster heads. Then cluster heads calculate group keys. Next cluster 
heads broadcast the group key in the cluster and send their seeds to BS to generate 
group key in higher level. Finally BS generates group key and broadcast it in the 
group. All broadcast encrypted by old group key. In this approach, each cluster head 
has to broadcast key update request and at last broadcast the new group key; each 
node has to send its partial number to cluster head. This costs too much energy on 
communication.  
 
Besides costly key update, another main problem of Panja is weak security. The 
whole cluster can be in danger if any node is compromised because all nodes in the 
cluster just have one key. Even the cluster head try to update the key, the new key would 
be disclosed because new key distribution encrypted by old key. 
 
5.2.2. Problem of LEAP 
As it is introduced in section 2.5.4, LEAP includes four types of keys: individual 
key, group key, cluster key and pairwise key. Different keys are used for encryption of 
different types of packets. 
 Individual key: This is a unique key shared by base station and each node. It 
is pre-distributed into each node before its deployment. The individual key 
shared by a node u and base station can be calculated as: 
 𝐾𝑢
𝑚 =  𝑓𝐾𝑚 (𝐼𝐷𝑢) 5.4 
f is a pseudo-random function and 𝐾𝑚 is the master key only known by base 
station.  
 Pairwise key: This is a key shared by each node with its each immediate 
neighbor. The establishment of pairwise key includes four steps: key 
pre-distribution, neighbor discovery, pairwise key establishment and key 
erasure. In the first step, node u is pre- loaded with 𝐾𝑖 which helps it to 
generate master key 𝐾𝑢. 𝐾𝑖 is an initial key generated by controller.  
 𝐾𝑢 =  𝑓𝐾𝑖 (𝐼𝐷𝑢) 5.5 
The next step is neighbor discovery, node u set timer at time  𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛. Then node u 
broadcasts a HELLO message including its ID. The neighbor node v receives 
the message and responds to node u with an acknowledgement (ACK) 
including its ID. This ACK is authenticated by master key 𝐾𝑣 which is derived 
from 𝐾𝑖. Node u verifies it by 𝐾𝑣 which is generated by received ID of v 
and 𝐾𝑖. The third step is pairwise key establishment. The pairwise key shared 
by node u and v is: 
 𝐾𝑢𝑣 =  𝑓𝐾𝑣 (𝐼𝐷𝑢) 5.6 
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Node u and v calculate the key by this function. In the last step, the timer 
expires after  𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑛. Node u erase 𝐾𝑖 and all the master keys of its neighbors. 
 Cluster key: This key is shared by a node and all its immediate neighbors. 
Cluster key establishment after the pairwise key establishment. This key is a 
random number generated by node u. Then node u transports the key to all its 
neighbors encrypted by their pairwise key. 
 Group key: This key is shared by base station and all nodes in the network. 
LEAP uses a cluster based scheme to distribute the key.  
 
The main problems of LEAP include lack of flexibility due to key erasure. In this 
scheme, each node has to use master key which is derived from an initial key  𝐾𝑖 to 
join the network. But all nodes erase master key and the initial key  𝐾𝑖 after a specific  
period of time which means any node can only join the network in this period and no 
node is able to join after the period. Moreover, if initial key  𝐾𝑖 is disclosed, the 
adversary will be able to establish pairwise key with any node in the network. In 
addition, on key update, LEAP scheme just generates a pseudo-random number as a 
new cluster key which is not secure because cluster key is frequently used. The 
security of the key highly relies on pseudo-random number generation algorithm. 
Current research on this area shows that the numbers generated by any algorithms are 
repeating and can be broken by potential adversary. An adversary only needs to 
compromise one node to get the pseudo-random number generation algorithm. 
 
5.3. SEHKM Scheme 
Based on LEAP and Panja which described in chapter 3, a secure efficient 
hierarchical key management scheme for wireless sensor networks (SEHKM) is 
proposed. This scheme combines the advantages of LEAP and Panja, therefore it is a 
hierarchical scheme which supports three types of keys and defines key generation, 
transportation, update and node operations.  
 
The assumptions of the wireless sensor network scenarios that the proposed scheme 
can be used in are described here. Firstly, it is a dynamic hierarchical sensor network. 
There are node addition, revocation and replacement after network initialization. 
Secondly, the base station of network is a device with enough resources and always 
under the control of controller safely. The initialization phase of network is safe too. 
Then each node has a unique pre-loaded identity (ID), and the IDs which belong to 
removed and replaced nodes cannot be used again. After network clustering, a cluster 
head is able to get all IDs of member nodes. Next is all nodes beside base station can 
be compromised and the information in which will be exposed to the adversary. 
 
Here is a list of notations which appear in the following discussion. 
 BS is the base station. 
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 𝐶𝐻𝑖 is a cluster head i. 
 𝑁𝑢 is a participant node u. 
 𝐶𝑖 is a cluster which cluster head is node i 
 NK is the network key. 
 IN is an initial number. 
 𝐺𝐾𝑛 is the group key of the cluster which cluster head is n. 
 𝑃𝐾𝑥,𝑦 is the pairwise key of node x and y. 
 DPK𝑢,𝑖 is the disposable pairwise key shared by node u and i 
 𝑓𝑚(𝑥) is a pseudo-random function 
 𝑓(𝑘1, 𝑘2) is a function, in which p is a prime number and 𝛼 is its primitive 
root. 
 (𝑠)𝑘  means message s is encrypted by key k. 
 𝑁+ is positive integer set 
 
SEHKM scheme is presented in a two-layer hierarchical wireless sensor network. 
 
5.3.1. Keys Types 
Three types of keys in SEHKM are supported. They are network key, group key 
and pairwise key. 
 
 Network key. Network key is the key shared by the whole network. It helps 
with the initialization of a network. Besides, it is used for authentication and 
encryption of broadcast messages. Network key is pre-distributed in each node 
and employed for authentication. It should be renewed each time of key update 
and after any node operation. 
 Group key. Group key is shared by a group of nodes and each cluster is a 
group. In two-level hierarchical wireless sensor networks, a cluster head and 
all normal nodes in the same cluster is a group and share one key. All cluster 
heads and base station is a group and share one key too. Group key encrypts 
multicast message in the group. It is generated by group leader and should be 
renewed each time of key update and after any node operation in the cluster. 
 Pairwise key. Pairwise key is a key shared by specific pair of nodes which 
protects unicast messages. In SEHKM, not any pair of nodes has a pairwise 
key. Base station and each node shared one key, cluster head and each cluster 
member shared one key and assistant node and each cluster member shared 
one key. The pairwise keys shared by group leader and its member nodes are 
generated by Diffie-Hellman algorithm and stored in every participant. 
Moreover the pairwise key shared by base station and each node is pre- loaded 
in the node and generated in base station when it is needed. It is the same as 
the key shared by assistant node and member nodes in the same cluster.  
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5.3.2. Key Pre-distribution 
To satisfy key management requirements on security, pre-distribution of keys are 
essential to keep secrecy in initialization of a network. In SEHKM scheme, all nodes 
have to pre-distribute two keying materials: the network key and an initial number IN. 
 
During initialization phase, the pre- load IN and network key help to setup the 
network. After initialization of the network and distribution of all keys, network starts 
requiring application. In the case of node compromise, damage or flat battery, node 
addition is required. A new node is pre- loaded with current network key and IN which 
can help the node to join the network. Without authorization using these two keying 
materials, any joining requests from nodes should be rejected. In order to keep secrecy, 
IN and the network key will be updated by BS after a period of time. 
 
Network key is updated periodically and shared by all nodes in the network while 
IN is pre-distributed in each node during initialization phase and erased from every 
node after all keys are established. Then IN is updated periodically and only known 
by base station and newly adding nodes. These nodes have to erase IN after join the 
network.  
 
5.3.3. Initialization 
In SEHKM, the pre-distributed network key helps with node clustering of the 
network and disposable pairwise key establishment by IN follows. 
 
5.3.3.1. Disposable Pairwise Key Establishment 
In the network clustering, each member node u joins the cluster of the head node i 
and generates the disposable pairwise key by IN and its ID using function f. 
 𝐷𝑃𝐾𝑢,𝑖  =  𝑓𝐼𝑁 (𝐼𝐷𝑢) 5.7 
As a cluster head knows all IDs of its member nodes, it is able to calculate the 
disposable pairwise key with each member node. After network clustering and 
generation of disposable pairwise key with head node, each node erases IN and only 
remains disposable pairwise key. 
 
5.3.3.2. The First Group Key Establishment 
Group key is shared by a group of nodes. Base station and all cluster heads 
constitute a higher level group, each cluster head and its member nodes in the same 
cluster form a group. In another word, a cluster is a group and cluster head is the 
group leader. The group leader generates group key and broadcasts it in the group. 
The first group key is a random number generated by group leader and its 
transportation is encrypted by disposable pairwise key. The algorithm that generates 
the following group keys is presented in section 5.3.4. 
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5.3.3.3. Network Key Establishment 
After group key employment, base station generates a random number as the new 
network key. Base station encrypts the key by group key and broadcasts the key to all 
cluster heads, then each cluster head broadcasts the key encrypted by its group key to 
its own member nodes. 
 
The pseudo-code of the above process can be put as following: 
Disposable pairwise key establishment:  
For each cluster head i, 𝑢 ∈  𝐶𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈  𝐶𝐵𝑆 
  { 𝐷𝑃𝐾𝑢,𝑖  =  𝑓𝐼𝑁 (𝐼𝐷𝑢) 
For each node u,  
  {  𝐷𝑃𝐾𝑢,𝑖  =  𝑓𝐼𝑁 (𝐼𝐷𝑢) } 
  } 
 
Group key establishment: 
For each cluster head i, i ∈  𝐶𝐵𝑆  
{ 𝐺𝐾𝑖 = 𝐾𝐺(𝑙)‘Generation of group key’ 
For cluster head sends GK to each node u, u ∈  𝐶𝑖 
  { 𝐶𝐻𝑖  → 𝑁𝑢 ∶  (𝐺𝐾𝑖)𝐷𝑃𝐾𝑢,𝑖  } 
} 
 
Network key update: 
NK = KG(l) ‘Generation of network key in BS’ 
𝐵𝑆 → ∗ ∶   (𝑁𝐾)𝐺𝐾𝐵𝑆  ‘BS broadcasts NK to all cluster head’ 
 For each cluster head i broadcasts NK to all node, 𝑖 ∈  𝐶𝐵𝑆  
     { 𝐶𝐻𝑖  → ∗ ∶ (𝑁𝐾)𝐺𝐾𝑖 } 
 
5.3.3.4. Pairwise Key Establishment 
There are three types of pairwise keys in the scheme which distinguished by their 
generation and storage. The first type is group associated pairwise keys which shared 
by group leaders with their member nodes and the pairwise keys shared by BS with 
cluster heads. The second type of pairwise keys is assistant node associated. This 
pairwise key is shared by assistant node with member nodes in the same cluster and 
the key shared by assistant node with BS. The last type is disposable pairwise key and 
it will be erased after the establishment of all keys. 
 
 Group associated pairwise key establishment: 
The generation of group associated pairwise key uses Diffie-Hellman algorithm. 
For example, in a group, the leader i generates a random seed  𝑔1𝑖, then calculates 𝑔1𝑖
′  
as:  
 𝑔1𝑖
′ =  𝛼𝑔1𝑖  mod 𝑝 5.8 
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The group leader broadcasts 𝑔1𝑖
′  encrypted by group key in the group. Then a 
member node u generates g2𝑢 and sends 𝑔2𝑢
′  to group leader i. 𝑔2𝑢
′ is encrypted by 
the disposable pairwise key. Therefore group leader gets 𝑔2𝑢
′ . Then the pairwise key 
between member node u and group leader i is: 
 𝑃𝐾𝑢,𝑖  = 𝑓(𝑔1𝑖 , 𝑔2𝑢 ) 5.9 
And the function f is: 
 𝑓(𝑘1,𝑘2) = 𝛼
𝑘1𝑘2  mod 𝑝 5.10 
 In this function, 𝑝 is a prime number and 𝛼  is the primitive root of 𝑝 . 
𝑘1, 𝑘2 < 𝑝. 𝛼 and 𝑝 are known by all nodes. 
 
 Cluster head i has 𝑔1𝑖 and  𝑔2𝑢
′  , the PK is : 
𝑃𝐾𝑢,𝑖  =  𝛼
𝑔1𝑖 𝑔2𝑢  mod 𝑝 =  (𝛼𝑔2𝑢  mod 𝑝)𝑔1𝑖  mod 𝑝 = 𝑔2𝑢
′ 𝑔1𝑖  mod 𝑝    5.11 
Node u has 𝑔2𝑢  and 𝑔1𝑖
′ , the PK is: 
𝑃𝐾𝑢,𝑖  =  𝛼
𝑔1𝑖 𝑔2𝑢  mod 𝑝 =  (𝛼𝑔1𝑖  mod 𝑝)𝑔2𝑢  mod 𝑝 =  𝑔1𝑖
′ 𝑔2𝑢  mod 𝑝 5.12 
After generation of pairwise key, it is kept by both group leader and member node. 
All cluster heads will erase the disposable pairwise key shared with each member 
node after a fixed period of time. 
 
The pseudo-code of process of establishment of pairwise key shared between group 
leader and its member node can be shown as: 
For each cluster head i, 𝑖 ∈  𝐶𝐵𝑆  
  { 𝐶𝐻𝑖  → ∗ ∶ (𝑔1𝑖
′ )𝐺𝐾𝑖   
    For each node u, 𝑢 ∈  𝐶𝑖 
      {  𝑁𝑢  → 𝐶𝐻𝑖 ∶  (𝑔2𝑢
′ )𝐷𝑃𝐾𝑢,𝑖  
       𝑃𝐾𝑢,𝑖  = 𝑓(𝑔1𝑖 , 𝑔2𝑢 ) =  𝑔1𝑖
′ 𝑔2𝑢  mod 𝑝 ‘u gets PK with i’}  
    For cluster head i calculates PK shared with each node u  
     { 𝑃𝐾𝑢,𝑖  = 𝑓(𝑔1𝑖 , 𝑔2𝑢 ) =  𝑔2𝑢
′ 𝑔1𝑖  mod 𝑝 ‘i gets PK with u’} 
} 
 
 Assistant node associated pairwise key establishment: 
An assistant node is selected beside the cluster head in each cluster. The assistant 
node associated pairwise key is generated by a random function. 𝑃𝐾𝑢,𝑣 is pairwise 
key shared by node u and v. m is a number only known by generator node v. The 
function is: 
 𝑃𝐾𝑢,𝑣 = 𝑓𝑚(𝐼𝐷𝑢) 5.13 
Then generator node v sends 𝑃𝐾𝑢,𝑣 to node u. Node u stores  𝑃𝐾𝑢,𝑣  while node v 
only stores node u’s ID. It will generate 𝑃𝐾𝑢,𝑣  if it is needed. 
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For a key shared by the assistant node and a member node, the assistant node plays 
the role of generator. However BS is the generator for the pairwise key between BS 
and an assistant node. After establishments of all pairwise keys, IN and disposable 
pairwise keys will be erased after a period of time. 
 
The pseudo-code of establishment of assistant node associated pairwise key is 
presented in the following: 
Pairwise key shared by assistant node and normal node: 
For each assistant node a, 𝑎 ∈  𝐶𝑖, 𝑖 ∈  𝐶𝐵𝑆 
  { 𝐶𝐻𝑖 → 𝑁𝑎 ∶  (𝐼𝐷𝑢1, 𝐼𝐷𝑢2 , 𝐼𝐷𝑢3, … , 𝐼𝐷𝑢𝑗 )𝑃𝐾𝑖,𝑎 , {u1, … , u𝑗, 𝑎, i} =  𝐶𝑖   
    For assistant node a gets pairwise key shared with each node j, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶𝑖 
      {  𝑃𝐾𝑎,𝑗 =   𝑓𝑚 (𝐼𝐷𝑗), m ∈ 𝑁
+ ‘a gets pairwise key shared with j’ 
        𝐷𝑃𝐾𝑎,𝑗 = 𝑓𝐼𝑁 (𝐼𝐷𝑗) ‘a is able to calculate the disposable pairwise key’ 
} 
    For assistant node a sends PK to each node j 
      { 𝑁𝑎  →  𝑁𝑗 ∶ (𝑃𝐾𝑎,𝑗)𝐷𝑃𝐾𝑎 ,𝑗  }     
} 
 
PK shared by BS and an assistant node: 
For each cluster head i, 𝑖 ∈  𝐶𝐵𝑆  
  { 𝐶𝐻𝑖 → 𝐵𝑆 ∶  (𝐼𝐷𝑎)𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆 ,𝑖  , 𝑎 ∈  𝐶𝑖 } 
For BS generates PK shared with each assistant node a 
  { 𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆,𝑎 =   𝑓𝑚(𝐼𝐷𝑎), m ∈ N ‘BS gets each PK shared with assistant node’ 
    𝐷𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆,𝑎 = 𝑓𝐼𝑁 (𝐼𝐷𝑎) ‘BS is able to calculate the disposable pairwise key’ 
}  
For BS sends PK to each cluster head i, 𝑖 ∈  𝐶𝐵𝑆  
  { BS →  𝐶𝐻𝑖 ∶ ((𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆,𝑎)𝐷𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆,𝑎 )𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆 ,𝑖  } 
For cluster head i, it sends PK to assistant node a, 𝑎 ∈  𝐶𝑖 
  {𝐶𝐻𝑖  →  𝑁𝑎 ∶  ((𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆,𝑎)𝐷𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆 ,𝑎 )𝑃𝐾𝑖,𝑎 } 
After this step, all keys are established. IN and the disposable pairwise key will be 
erased. The initialization of keys has completed.  
 
5.3.4. Key Update 
After the initialization phase, the key update is the key management operation. Key 
update is carried out in regular basis or in one of the following circumstances, ie node 
addition, revocation and replacement. A list of notations is defined below before the 
different types of key update are presented.   
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 BS :  base station. 
 CH :  cluster head. 
 MN :  member node. 
 NK : network key 
 GK:  group key. 
 PK :  pairwise key. 
 DPK:  disposable pairwise key. 
 IK :  temporary key. 
 SRN: small random numbers  
 
5.3.4.1. Regular Key Update 
Regular key update is significant to keep secrecy of keys. However each sensor 
node has limited energy supply on a battery which is difficult or even impossible to be 
replaced or recharged in many applications. So the resources cost of key update has to 
be reasonable in efficiency consideration. In this section, a method which helps to 
reduce energy cost in key update is proposed. 
 
For the purpose of efficiency, in SEHKM, only the network key and group keys 
will be updated periodically. Network key is generated by the base station while group 
key is established by collaborating of all nodes in the cluster. The mechanism of the 
group key generation in the upper layer is the same as in the cluster level. Therefore 
the following discussion on the proposed key update algorithm focuses on the group 
key update on the cluster level. The main feature of the key update is that member 
nodes send small random numbers (SRNs) along with normal traffic data together to 
reduce transmission energy. In current cryptography algorithm, some of them using 
block cipher technique which is treats a block of plaintext as a whole to be encrypted 
[66]. If the message is not long enough as the block, 0 is used to fill the empty parts. 
So these empty parts can be used to carry the SRNs. 
 
The group key update includes four steps: (1) member nodes send SRNs to the 
cluster head; (2) the cluster head stores and transforms SRNs; (3) the group key 
generation; (4) the group key distribution.  
 
1) In the normal network operation, a member node attaches an r-byte SRN with 
its normal application data regularly. Not all packets have a SRN attached. The 
frequency of SRN attachment at each node is fixed.  
 
2) A cluster head stores these SRNs collected and assembles a number 𝑁1 of K  
bytes. K is the key size where K>r. If only r−i bytes of last SRN are used, then 
the remaining i bytes will be used for assembling  𝑁2. When 𝑁2is assembled, 
the function f is used to generate a new number and  𝑁1 is updated with this 
new number. Only the very first  𝑁1 is assembled from the SRNs collected. 
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The following   𝑁1 is from the recursive function f 5.10 using the last 𝑁1 
and 𝑁2:  
 𝑁1 = 𝑓(𝑁1,𝑁2) 5.14 
The following SRNs are used to assemble  𝑁2 only. SRNs are from different 
nodes. The order of them is not important as long as they are not from one 
node only. If a node sends SRNs more than [K/n] times continually, the cluster 
head should erase [K/2] bytes and generates [K/2] bytes of random number to 
re-assemble  𝑁1 or  𝑁2. The process keeps going till the cluster head receives 
a command to update the group key. Then all the following SRNs are 
discarded.  
 
Let us assume a cluster C has L nodes, C = {1, 2, 3… L} and K=8, r=3. Figure 
12,  𝑛1 ≠ 𝑛2 , 𝑛3 ≠ 𝑛4  , 𝑛𝑖  ∈ C, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ L, the initial   𝑁1  assembling is 
shown as: 
 
Figure 12: The generation of the initial  𝑁1 
After the initial   𝑁1 is assembled, the following 𝑁1 is generated by function f  
and 𝑁2 is always assembled from SRNs. 
 
3) The third step is group key generation. When the cluster head needs to update 
the group key, if the SRNs received are not enough to form a new 𝑁2, then the 
cluster head pads  𝑁2 with a generated random number. Figure 13 shows the 
last 𝑁1 and 𝑁2 before the key update. If the 𝑁2 is empty, which means the 
last  𝑁2 is just assembled and new  𝑁1 is calculated, then the cluster head 
generates a K-byte number as 𝑁2. In Figure 13, 𝑥 ∈ 𝐶. 
 
 
Figure 13: The generation of the last 𝑁1 and 𝑁2 
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The group key is generated by the function f 5.10 using the last 𝑁1 and 𝑁2. 
 𝐺𝐾 = 𝑓(𝑁1,𝑁2) 5.15 
If a node compromise or damage is detected, then the  𝑁1, 𝑁2 generated 
from SRNs should be discarded as it is hard to figure out which parts of them 
are from the compromised nodes. Then the cluster head will use the new 
network key as  𝑁1 and generates 𝑁2 by itself to calculate a new group key. 
 
4) The cluster head distributes the new group key and new network key together. 
Here it is assumed that the new network key has been generated in BS and 
distributed to the cluster heads. The key distribution can be used by previous 
group keys. However, if node compromise is detected, the distribution should 
be carried out securely by pairwise keys. 
 
5.3.4.2. Node Addition 
 A new node pre- installs the current network key and IN. The disposable pairwise 
key can be calculated using function f as it is described in section 1.3.3.1. The new 
node has to be authenticated by network key and disposable pairwise key to join the 
network. Figure 14 shows the addition process of normal node. 
      
 
Figure 14: Node addition 
The pseudo-code of adding node u can be shown as: 
Node addition: 
Pre-load IN and NK into node u 
Node u generates disposable pairwise key and then erases IN 
   𝐷𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆,𝑢 =   𝑓𝐼𝑁 (𝐼𝐷𝑢)  
Node u sends join request to cluster head i, 𝑖 ∈  𝐶𝐵𝑆  
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  𝑁𝑢  → 𝐶𝐻𝑖 ∶  𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡, 𝐼𝐷𝑢, (𝐼𝐷𝑢, (𝐼𝐷𝑢)𝐷𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆 ,𝑢 )𝑁𝐾) 
If the message is verified by NK in cluster head i then 
  {  𝐶𝐻𝑖  → 𝐵𝑆 ∶  (𝐼𝐷𝑢, (𝐼𝐷𝑢)𝐷𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆,𝑢 )𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆 ,𝑖  
     If the message is verified by 𝐷𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆,𝑢  in BS then 
      {  BS →  𝐶𝐻𝑖 ∶  (𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝐷𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆,𝑢)𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆 ,𝑖   
         Node u gets 𝐺𝐾𝑖 and sends to generate 𝑃𝐾𝑢,𝑖  
             𝐶𝐻𝑖  →  𝑁𝑢 ∶  (𝐺𝐾𝑖 ,   𝑔1𝑖
′ )𝐷𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆 ,𝑢 
             𝑃𝐾𝑢,𝑖  =  𝑔1𝑖
′ 𝑔2𝑢  mod 𝑝    
             𝑁𝑢  → 𝐶𝐻𝑖: (𝑔2𝑢
′ )𝐷𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆 ,𝑢 
         Cluster head generates 𝑃𝐾𝑢,𝑖 
               𝑃𝐾𝑢,𝑖  =  𝑔2𝑢
′ 𝑔1𝑖  mod 𝑝    
        Assistant node a receives ID of u, generates 𝑃𝐾𝑎,𝑢  and sends it to u 
            𝐶𝐻𝑖  →  𝑁𝑎 ∶  (𝐼𝐷𝑢,   𝐷𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆,𝑢)𝑃𝐾𝑖 ,𝑎
 
            𝑃𝐾𝑎,𝑢 =   𝑓ℎ(𝐼𝐷𝑢)  
            𝑁𝑎  →  𝑁𝑢 ∶  (𝑃𝐾𝑎,𝑢)𝐷𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆 ,𝑢  
        All nodes erase 𝐷𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆,𝑢  
        } 
     else if BS rejects the request and update NK then 
         BS → 𝐶𝐻𝑖 ∶  (𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡)𝑃𝐾𝐵𝑆 ,𝑖 
   else cluster rejects the request 
   }    
5.3.4.3. Node Revocation 
Node revocation includes two steps: the first step is to remove the node from 
network, the second step is to update all keys that the removed node has. During the 
time period after node removal and before key update, node addition is not allowed. 
The node revocation process is shown in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15: Node revocation 
  If the removed node is a cluster head, base station sends a temporary IK to assistant 
node and cluster heads around. Assistant node distributes the IK to all normal nodes 
and let them join the nearest cluster to them. Nodes may join different cluster and they 
use IK to authenticate. Then these nodes establish pairwise key with new head and 
assistant node. They also receive new group key. All the old keys are erased. At last, 
the network key is updated. 
 
If an assistant node is removed, the head will updates the group key and distributes 
it by pairwise key with each node; then it picks up a new assistant node and gives its 
all IDs of other nodes; next the new assistant node generates pairwise keys shared 
with other normal nodes. The BS updates the network key after the cluster key is 
updated. 
 
If it is a member node, the cluster head just updates group key and erases its 
pairwise key. Then the BS updates network key. 
 
5.3.4.4. Node Replacement 
Node replacement acts as node addition and then node revocation. The process is 
shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16: Node replacement 
5.4. Summary 
In this chapter, Panja and LEAP schemes are further analyzed. The drawbacks of 
the two schemes are identified. A new secure efficient hierarchical key management   
scheme (SEHKM) is proposed. It covers key type definition, key generation, key 
distribution, regular key update and key update in node addition, revocation and 
replacement. The proposed scheme is aimed to offer strong security and efficient 
performance. The evaluation of the proposed scheme will be presented in the next 
chapter which includes security assessment, efficiency assessment and operation 
assessment. 
6. Evaluation of SEHKM 
In this chapter the SEHKM scheme is evaluated. Firstly, the efficiency of SEHKM 
is analyzed and simulation results are shown. Then the security of the proposed 
scheme is assessed based on the criteria proposed in chapter 3. Lastly, the operation 
assessment of the scheme is presented. 
 
6.1. Performance Analysis  
In SEHKM, the first network key and group key are random numbers that 
generated by the base station and cluster head. Pairwise key establishment and 
distribution only carry out once. The energy cost on these processes is fixed and not 
expensive. However network key and group key are updated periodically, the energy 
cost on each time of key update should be reasonable to satisfy efficiency requirement. 
The network key is a pseudo-random number that generated by the base station and 
distributed cluster by cluster. The energy cost on network key update is reasonable. 
The group key update algorithm in SEHKM is similar with Panja scheme, but the 
proposed algorithm using the empty parts in block cipher technic to send keying 
materials which is much more efficient. Figure 17 shows the process of group key 
update in Panja and the proposed scheme. 
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Figure 17: The process of group key update in Panja and proposed scheme 
6.1.1. Performance in Two-layer Hierarchical Network 
In order to analyze efficiency of SEHKM, it is assumed that all key updates carry 
out in a two-layer hierarchical network. Let us assume a network 
G = {𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑛3 ,𝑛4 , … ,𝑛𝑁 },  𝑛1, 𝑛2 , 𝑛3, 𝑛4, … , 𝑛𝑁  are nodes in the network. The base 
station is considered as a member of G, ie BS∈G. 𝑒𝑖
𝑐𝑝
 is energy consumption on 
computation in node 𝑛𝑖 and  𝑒𝑖
𝑐𝑚 is energy consumption on communication in node 
𝑛𝑖. Let’s assume all clusters have the same size m, ie a cluster has m nodes including 
the cluster head. The total number of clusters is (N−1)/m. The analysis is also based 
on the following assumptions: all keys have the same size; One encryption or a 
decryption of the same length of key consumes 1 computation energy unit E; A 
transmission of the key consumes 1 transmission energy unit T; One key needs 1 
storage unit S.  
 
6.1.1.1. The energy consumption on first distribution of all keys 
In the last chapter, it is presented that the energy consumption on initial distribution 
of all keys is different from cost on key update. It assumes  𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙  is the energy 
consumption on first distribution of all keys. Then  𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙  should include two parts: 
computation and communication costs. 
 
 Computation cost for cryptography: 
 Network key: The key is encrypted by BS at first and the cost is 1(E). The cost 
for all cluster heads to receive and decrypt the key is (N−1)/m (E). One cluster 
head encrypts the key and it costs 1(E), then decryption in member nodes cost 
m−1 (E). So the computation cost in one cluster is 1+m−1=m (E). There are 
(N−1)/m clusters in the network, so they totally cost N−1 (E). Thus computation 
cost for network key update is (N−1)/m +N (E). 
 Group key: First, BS encrypts the key by each pairwise key and each cluster 
head decrypts the key. It costs 2(N−1)/m (E). Then a cluster head encrypts the 
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key by each pairwise key and each node decrypts the key. It costs 
2(m−1)(N−1)/m (E) for all clusters. So the total cost is 2m(N−1)/m (E). 
 Pairwise key: First BS encrypts its seed and broadcasts it. Each cluster head 
receives the seed and decrypts it. It costs (N−1)/m+1 (E). Then each cluster 
head encrypts its seed and BS decrypts all seeds. It costs 2(N−1)/m (E). In 
higher layer, the cost is 3(N−1)/m+1 (E). In lower layer, the process is similar 
and the cost is (3m−2)(N−1)/m (E). The keys shared by an assistant node and 
member nodes cost 2(m−2)(N−1)/m (E) and the keys shared by BS and all 
assistant nodes cost 2(N−1)/m (E). The total cost for all pairwise keys is 
(5m−1)(N−1)/m+1 (E) 
 
The total computation cost on initial distribution of all keys is: 
 ∑ 𝑒𝑖
𝑐𝑝
𝑁
𝑖=1
= 8𝑁 +
𝑁 − 1
𝑚
− 6 (E) 6.1 
 Communication cost: 
 Network key: BS broadcasts the network key to all cluster heads and then 
cluster heads broadcasts the key to all member nodes. It costs 1+ (N−1)/m (T). 
 Group key: It is similar with network key and it costs 1+ (N−1)/m (T). 
 Pairwise key: The seed exchange on the higher layer costs 1+ (N−1)/m (T) and 
the lower layer costs N−1 (T). The assistant node associated pairwise key costs 
N−1− (N−1)/m (T). So the total cost on pairwise key transmission is 2N−1 (T). 
 
Therefore the total communication cost on first distribution of all keys is: 
 ∑ 𝑒𝑖
𝑐𝑚
𝑁
𝑖=1
= 2𝑁 +
2(𝑁 − 1)
𝑚
+ 1  (T) 6.2 
The energy consumption on the first distribution of all keys can be shown as: 
 𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 = ∑ (𝑒𝑖
𝑐𝑝 + 𝑒𝑖
𝑐𝑚)
𝑁
𝑖=1
= (8𝑁 +
𝑁 − 1
𝑚
− 6) (E) + [2𝑁 +
2(𝑁 − 1)
𝑚
+ 1](T) 
6.3 
6.1.1.2. The energy consumption on group key update 
In SEHKM, the group key update algorithm is different from the first establishment. 
Thus energy cost on key update is different too. It assumes  𝐸𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒  is the energy 
consumption on each time of group key update. The computation and communication 
costs are: 
 Computation cost for cryptography:  In higher layer, BS encrypts the key 
and all cluster heads decrypt the key, it costs 1+ (N−1)/m (E). In lower layer, a 
cluster head encrypts the key and all member nodes decrypt the key, all clusters 
cost N−1 (E). So the total cost on computation for cryptography is N+ (N−1)/m 
(E). The total computation cost on group key update is: 
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  6.4 
∑ 𝑒𝑖
𝑐𝑝
𝑁
𝑖=1
= 𝑁 +
𝑁 − 1
𝑚
  (E) 
 Communication cost: The regular group key update is that cluster head 
broadcasts the group key in the cluster. So the cost is 1+ (N−1)/m (T). The 
communication cost on group key update is : 
 ∑ 𝑒𝑖
𝑐𝑚
𝑁
𝑖=1
=  
𝑁 − 1
𝑚
+ 1  (T) 6.5 
The energy consumption on group key update is: 
 𝐸𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 = ∑ (𝑒𝑖
𝑐𝑝 + 𝑒𝑖
𝑐𝑚)
𝑁
𝑖=1
= (𝑁 +
𝑁 − 1
𝑚
) (E) + (
𝑁 − 1
𝑚
+ 1)(T) 6.6 
6.1.1.3. Storage cost 
In SEHKM, BS, cluster heads, assistant nodes and normal nodes have different 
storage cost. The storage cost is shown in Table 9:  
Table 9: Storage costs in different nodes 
Node Network key 
(S) 
Group key (S) Pairwise key 
(S) 
Total (S) 
Base station 1 1 (N−1)/m 2+ (N−1)/m 
Cluster head 1 2 m−1 m+2 
Assistant node 1 1 2 4 
Member node 1 1 2 4 
 
The table shows a member node has 4 keys, a cluster head has m+2 keys and the 
base station has 2+ (N−1)/m keys. The storage cost is reasonable. 
 
6.1.1.4. Efficiency of SEHKM compares with LEAP and Panja 
SEHKM is proposed based on LEAP and Panja, the network key update in LEAP 
and SEHKM are similar while Panja does not support network key. Pairwise key in 
LEAP and SEHKM are both not updated. The cluster key in LEAP and the group key 
in Panja are the same as the group key in SEHKM which are all shared by a group of 
nodes. Therefore the efficiency comparison of the three schemes is related to energy 
consumption on group key or cluster key update. The computation and 
communication costs on the update of the group key are analyzed to measure the 
efficiency of LEAP, Panja and SEHKM.  
 
In LEAP, let d to be the number of neighbors of each node. Each node has a cluster 
key shared with its neighbors, then computation cost is (d+1)(N−1) (E) and 
communication cost is N−1 (T). In Panja, each member node sends a partial key to 
cluster head to compute a group key, then cluster head broadcasts the key. The cost on 
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computation is 3N+ (N−1)/m −2 (E) and communication cost is N+ (N−1)/m (T). 
Table 10 shows the comparison of computation and communication costs on group 
key update in LEAP, Panja and SEHKM.  
Table 10: The efficiency comparison of SEHKM with LEAP and Panja 
Scheme Computation (E) Communication (T) 
LEAP (d+1)(N−1) N−1 
Panja 
3𝑁 +
𝑁 − 1
𝑚
− 2 𝑁 +
𝑁 − 1
𝑚
 
SEHKM 
𝑁 +
𝑁 − 1
𝑚
 
𝑁 − 1
𝑚
+ 1 
 
It shows that for each time of group key or cluster key update, the proposed scheme 
costs the least energy on both computation and communication. 
 
6.1.1.5. Simulation result 
To further analyze the efficiency of the proposed scheme, the simulation of three 
schemes’ implementation on a popular MICA2 [67] sensor node in MATLAB is 
presented. Table 11 shows the total energy consumption (Joule) on group key update 
when network size grows with the key size is 32 bytes using DES-CBC for encryption. 
The simulation results in the table show as that SEHKM always consumes less energy 
than Panja and LEAP in group key update. 
Table 11: The energy consumption (Joule) of group key update in SEHKM, LEAP 
and Panja  
N m d LEAP Panja SEHKM 
100 20 8 0.33264 0.27179 0.026468 
200 20 8 0.66864 0.54395 0.050828 
300 20 8 1.00464 0.81611 0.075188 
400 20 8 1.34064 1.08827 0.099548 
500 20 8 1.67664 1.36043 0.123908 
600 20 8 2.01264 1.63259 0.148268 
700 20 8 2.34864 1.90475 0.172628 
800 20 8 2.68464 2.17691 0.196988 
900 20 8 3.02064 2.44907 0.221348 
1000 20 8 3.69264 2.99339 0.270068 
 
6.1.2. Performance Comparison with Panja in Multiple Layers 
Hierarchical Networks  
The section 6.1.1 presents performance of SEHKM in a two-layer network. But a 
hierarchical network can be more than two layers, in which SEHKM and Panja 
schemes can be employed. This section presents the simulation results on energy cost 
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of Panja and SEHKM in a multiple layers hierarchical network. Figure 18 shows 
energy cost when a network degree is increasing. In the left one, network size is 
always around 107 and in the right one, number of cluster member is always 10. 
 
Figure 18: Energy cost when network degree is increasing 
6.2. Security and Operation Assessment 
The security criteria are proposed in chapter 3, based on the criteria, the security 
strength of SEHKM can be evaluated. The criteria include keying model, key 
distribution, key update, node operation and resilience. The proposed scheme is 
analyzed according to these five aspects. 
 Keying model: The scheme support network key, group key and pairwise key. 
Any node in the network has three types of key. The security is very strong. 
 Key distribution: The distribution of any key in the scheme is secured. In the 
initialization phase, group key is encrypted by the disposable pairwise key, 
network key is encrypted by group key and pairwise keying materials are 
encrypted by other keys, too. 
 Key update: The proposed scheme supports regular network key and group 
key update and the specific key update. 
 Node operation: The scheme supports node addition, revocation and 
replacement. The keying services for these operations are employed. 
 Resilience: The SEHKM scheme support securely key update after node 
compromise.  
 
Compare with LEAP and Panja, SEHKM provides higher security strength as it is 
shown in Table 12. 
 
The operation assessment of SEHKM is high, too. The hierarchical structure 
support scalability of a network, the network key ensures the accessibility and the 
scheme supports node operation which leads to better flexibility. 
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Table 12: The security comparison of SEHKM with LEAP and Panja 
Security criteria LEAP Panja SEHKM 
Keying model (20) All (20) Group key only 
(10) 
All (20) 
Key distribution 
(20) 
Encryption by 
different key (20) 
Basic encryption 
(5) 
Group key update 
is encrypted by the 
old key (15) 
Key update (20) Specific update 
(10) 
Specific and 
regular update (20) 
Specific and 
regular update (20) 
Node operation 
(20) 
No addition (10) All (20) All (20) 
Resilience (20) Security update 
(20) 
Not good (10) Security update 
(20) 
Total (100) 80 65 95 
 
 
6.3. Summary 
The proposed SEHKM scheme is evaluated in this chapter. The analysis and 
simulation results indicate the energy consumption of SEHKM is reasonable and 
more efficient than LEAP and Panja. The security assessment shows SEHKM 
provides very strong security and the strength is higher than the two schemes. The 
operation assessment shows the scheme is able to satisfy the operation requirement of 
wireless sensor networks. 
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7. Conclusion 
Key management is the essential service in network security. However the schemes 
in traditional network cannot be employed directly in wireless sensor networks due to 
constraints caused by their unique characteristics. The demand in security, limitations 
in hardware and unique characteristics of wireless sensor networks lead to special 
requirements including security, efficiency and operation aspects, which have to be 
satisfied in key management schemes in wireless sensor security. Many schemes are 
proposed for wireless sensor network security. However, there are still potential for 
further improvement in many aspects. Most existing research aims on security, but it 
is very hard to have a universal quantized assessment criteria. In the existing LEAP 
scheme, security is provided by four types of key. But it has problems including lack 
of flexibility and potential disclosing pairwise keys since a pairwise key is established 
by the same initial key. Panja scheme employs group Diffie-Hellman algorithm which 
is able to establish secure group key. However the scheme only supports the group 
key, if any node is compromised, the whole cluster is in danger. 
 
This research focuses on following issues related to key management in wireless 
sensor network security: 
 How can the criteria be established to assess the security and efficiency of 
the key management schemes? 
 How can the security of other nodes in the same cluster be strengthened 
when the cluster head is compromised in hierarchical wireless sensor 
networks? 
 How can the existing key update algorithm on hierarchical wireless sensor 
network be improved on efficiency? 
 
The first research question which is related to  the assessment criteria of key 
management schemes is addressed in chapter 2. All key management schemes have to 
satisfy security, efficiency and operation requirements of wireless sensor networks, so 
the assessment should also include all three aspects. Efficiency is easy to evaluate by 
simulation or analysis while security is always assessed subjectively and it is not easy 
to do comparison. To address this problem, security criteria are proposed based on 
processes of key management. Key management schemes’ security should be assessed 
in keying model, key distribution, key update, node operation and resilience. The 
simplest keying models are network key, group key and pairwise key. Usually a 
mixed model scheme is more secure than a single model scheme. However a single 
model scheme which supports pairwise keys also offers strong security. Key 
distribution should be carried out securely by different keys or using secret seeds. A 
secure scheme should support both regular key update and specific key update in 
some situations such as node compromise, node revocation and node replacement. 
Node operations including addition, revocation and replacement also should be 
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supported in a key management scheme in wireless sensor network to secure forward 
and backward secrecy. Resilience against node capture is also essential. The 
consequence of a node compromise on other nodes in a cluster should be as small as 
possible. 
 
In hierarchical wireless sensor networks, nodes are divided into clusters. A cluster 
head can manage and control member nodes in the cluster. The network gets benefits 
from this structure in data aggregation, less routing, more sleeping time for normal 
nodes and convenience in network management. Cluster heads are one of the key 
points in this structure. If a cluster head is compromised, the whole cluster will be in 
danger. An assistant node management is proposed to address this problem in chapter  
4. An assistant node is able to communicate with the head of its cluster head and other 
member nodes in the cluster. It can arrange other nodes to join other clusters if the 
cluster head is compromised or damaged. 
 
With the introduction of assistant node, a new key management scheme for cluster 
based hierarchical wireless sensor network is proposed. The new scheme, SEHKM, 
has addressed the drawbacks of two existing schemes Panja and LEAP. A concept of 
initial key is adopted in the new scheme to establish pairwise keys. The update of the 
initial key has enabled new nodes to securely join the network. A new group key 
generation algorithm based on pseudo-random numbers and group Deffie-hellman is 
used. Three types of keys, ie network key, group key and pairwise key are supported 
in SEHKM. The key generation, distribution and update are fully specified. The 
analysis and the simulation have shown that the new scheme has improvement on 
security strength and operation efficiency compared with the two popular schemes 
Panja and LEAP. 
 
In this research, new assessment criteria for wireless sensor network key 
management schemes are established. As wireless sensor networks are still evolving 
structure wise and security mechanism wise, new factors may be added to the 
assessment criteria. This can be studied in the future. Using Diffie-Hellman algorithm 
for pairwise key is expensive on communication. An alternative algorithm or new 
mechanism can be explored in the future. 
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